

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

The
Metaphysics of
Sri Ramanuja's
Sri Bhashya -

यतिश्चाभ्युदृष्टं मतमिह नवीनं तदपि किं
ततः प्रागेवान्यद्ब्रह्म तदपि किं वर्णनिकथे ।

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To
Sri Rámanuja

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INTRODUCTION

The system of Ramanuja occupies a significant and paramount place in the History of Vedantic philosophic thought. Starting from the vedic fountain, to use the orthodox phrase or metaphor, the rivers of interpretation flooded unrestrained in the very division and diversion of Sámkhya, Yoga, Vaisesika, Nyáya, Mímámsa, the Jaina and Buddhistic schools till finally every one of them was accepted and rejected in turn by the Philosophic Mind, and in exhaustion turned to the solacing grounds and surging oceanic expanse of the Vedantic thought. But neither did it find there what it vainly sought after, for wave within wave, and inundation after inundation revealed an unlimited and illimitable depth and interior. It could not (dropping the metaphor hereafter) sullenly closet itself to the fundamental assumptions, for never were they easy. It was alluring : pleasing in the extreme was the quiet rest in the initial revelation of the Vedantic aspiration in the Advaita of the Májaváda. But such a rest was very apparently shortlived. It was bound to be so, it could not be otherwise. It promised potencies of immense magnitudes and it heralded the death and deluge of this ego-centrism in life, its bitter and garnering fruits, in the ocean of a pure chaste and illumed and absorbing Experience of the Eternal Absolute Bliss. But the demand of the world was not replied ; after all the lure to thought was the world from which and for which it sought to exalt itself. So in its effort to conquer what it would enjoy, it could bear no divided rest, nor bear with quietude the 'hymn of hate' against life in its furious onmarch of time ; it wanted to subdue rather than deny, to accept rather than reject ; for power needs acceptance and overcoming, possession and glory, not the puny and impotent way of surrender and gloom, quietism and feebleness. But the lure was strong and remains strong ; not only was the recoil from life real and psychological, its votaries were great men, pure and magnificent flowers of Humanity—Sankara and Buddha.

But something ought to be done, that was the will of the Zeit Geist. Truth accepts no divided rule between itself and un-

reality. Understanding could be satisfied, if life would not be thwarted by mere denial. It may be called true and real and not a mere dream, for inasmuch as it exists should it not be called real and true, for, what is the criterion of reality but existence as it is for us ?

It may have the attribute of significant meaning but yet there need be no need to reject finally unity or identity, Ékatva, with or immergence into the Absolute from whose loins it sprang. This reconciliation the Great Bhaskara and Yadava Prakasa, the samucchayavadins, sought to do. But for all the efforts of these two Vedantins, Existence would accept no half-way house. It said that it shall be treated as either an inmate, a genuine entity in the family, an organ of the Absolute, rather than be treated as a ghost (or a pitri) whose reality is affirmed as a ghost and who ought to be satiated by such routine ablutions as it deserves, but for all its importunities never be a real entity—it can claim only that much of existence—that is, of an ineffectuality. Thus the half-hearted concession of the Bhédábhédavādins was not accepted. It strained to be counted as an entity, real absolutely and without any reserve or not at all. It was perhaps better to be treated as eternally unreal rather than be treated as real and unreal by fits and starts. In Ramanuja it found its leader, its voice and effectuality. It would live as one of the parent, in union (Ekeebháva) with its lord and God, rather than make the parent assume the ineffectual existence of the relations which he certainly would become if they are declared to be unreal. The inchoate utterances of the Vedic Realists found its logical culmination and echoes in the System of Ramanuja. Ramanuja was the first to claim eternality and reality for the World in Vedanta (for Vyasa mentions that the world is real in his commentary on the Yoga-Sutras). He was the first to recognize the fundamental unity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. As it was expressed “they are the three-fold cord by which our waggon is hitched to a star.” Of course we can neither entirely unify these three systems of value or entirely separate them. To repudiate any one of them is fatal. As Dean Inge says “it leaves us with our ideals in the air, and with the bastard faith of *fideisme*,” For him the same logical

Absolute, the demand of the intellect, is the moral Governor and the religious God or Personality and the Mystics' lover. This integral union of functioning in triple phases of the same ultimate reality in the sense of highest Perfection, as Person, as Governor, as God and as the Ultimate Truth and Existence in which everything finds its residence and suffusion, Ramanuja stresses in his philosophy.

It is a mistake to say that one of these phases can possibly be unreal, unreal because they are so different from each other and that activity seems to be an effort and restrained by time and causal sequence, and further appears to be based upon imperfection. But the fault of such an argument lies in this very patent fact, namely, that they are considered to belong to one same category which they are not, as they cannot be compared at all with each other, belonging as they do to different kinds of valuing. The proposition that only the logical Absolute is real, and that the Moral Ideal and the spiritual God are unreal, does not sound true mainly because the comparison is not between the same kind of ideal or valuing but between different kinds of valuing.

In this thesis the metaphysical system of Ramanuja will be traced. It is considered in three parts¹ for the convenience of study. The first treats about the theory of cause (or in other words, the cause-effect continuum) ; the second about the evolution of the universe or the process as in space-time continuum ; the third about the ontological status of the ultimate reality or to use the well-worn phrase, the Substance. But the vedantic substance is no scholastic category that goes by that name. It is a mistake, perhaps unpardonable, to treat the same as the scholastic substance. Nor is it a *tertium quid*. It is not the passive *tabula rasa* either, in which somehow the element of perception is inhered or introduced or the element of change predicated. It was a great day for Indian philosophy when activity was reckoned to be the core of existence rather than the mere passive spectator. The parallel in the west was the Leibnizian theory of the Monad as

1. I have had the suggestion of Prof. P.N. Srinivasa Chariar, M.A., in thus dividing the subject into the three main parts and in the general method.

the active existence not merely the passive substance of the Cartesians. The merit of such an acceptance in Indian philosophy goes to Ramanuja rather than to any one else. There is something radically wrong in the concept of Intelligence or the Conscious Principle or Spirit as a passive entity (as the Samkhyans and the Māyavadins held), but whose activity (a fact of experience) is a mysterious and unreal attribution due to a third entity unreal by itself. Experience, qua experience, knows no such grand passivity and the life of the Spirit or even of the finite mind or self is a bubbling stream of overflowing creative dynamism. Life, or activity belongs to spirit, but matter is no vanishing entity, unreal in its core or even imperfect, one is tempted to add. "Perception does not grow into (knowledge or) reflection, and in so doing lose its specific quality as a mode of knowledge. Perception makes its own unique contribution to the life of the process. There is no substitute for it, and no way of supplanting it or superseding it in its own kind. No conceptual activity whatsoever can conjure a single perceived fact or perceptual act into existence as a form of knowledge. The deeper apprehension, the greater knowledge is a new creation of the energy of the mind, as distinctive in its order as that of perception, and as distinct in kind as one organ of perception is from another."¹ But in cognitive activity the mind takes up an attitude of superiority in order to hold the percept fugitive and under its control, which act only leaves the mind to reflect upon the signs and symbols which it has created to represent such vanishing experiences of the objects. In a word, mind in its reflective and energetic experience signalises its superiority or transcendent character "over the limits of perceptual fact by contriving mere perceptual symbols to correspond with and meet the abstracter aims of reflection", but with this specific aim that what it attempts shall have its active response in the sphere of actual perception or matter. For direction the latter has none, even of the Unconscious. Samkhya is wrong in throwing the direction on the unconscious. All activity is founded upon a content upon which it can per-

1 Baillie Aris. Soc. Pro. Vol. 19. "Stereoscopic character of knowledge."

form. Activity, qua activity, exists nowhere. It is sheer abstraction to claim that the percept is not the beginning and the primal necessity of reflection, and there is the organic connexion between the operations of perception and conception. Experience for us means to be factual, and though this factuality need not be always sensorial, yet it can be called perceptual, as something "given".

Yet there is need for pointing out to certain criticisms at the very outset against the concept of a substrate behind activity, or an object for it to influence as mere 'scholastic' modes of thinking as one prominent writer on Indian philosophy has thought it necessary to style it. It may be so, here it is not wise to enter into any theorising as to its logicality or not, but only to call attention to the views of Ramanuja and leave them there for what they are worth. But one is tempted, all the same, to retort that one is content to know and understand experience (in its actuality and purity) rather than jump with an understanding that clings to no basement, and descends nowhere but ascending to the pure regions of vacuity and therefore of lightness which in clarion calls, it trumpets as the REALITY, but all the while calling for the help it does not find (due to its own diseased reflection) in experience or reality. . . Content with this remark, what we seek in experience are principles, ultimate and real, their absolute relations, their function in reality as we know it, meaning by experience every kind of cognition and perception, be it from the spiritual and mystic revelations downwards to the unconscious and sub-conscious levels, but valid all the same, because of their ultimate non-contradiction with normal experience. The hope of every philosophical attempt has been and is, if it be worth its name, the ultimate analysis and synthesis of all experience, giving legitimate hopes that may be attained by us in our effort to master nature which somehow we feel fetters us. This is what Ramanuja attempts to do in his Philosophy which we shall trace taking as his authoritative statement the Vedanta Sutra commentary known as the Sri-Bhashya'.¹

¹ All through this work the Translations given are that of Thibaut and wherever there are the pages noted they refer to that translation.

THE THEORY OF CAUSE

OR

CAUSALITY

In any metaphysical enquiry, the origin of reality or of the actual, is a most important problem and on that depends all speculation of an ultimate category or substance. Causality as a law is a synthetic principle and not an *a priori* truth. In the order of experience no inherent necessity can be demonstrated. In the uniformity which is observed with which sequences of 'perceptions' take place or rather regular connexion between causes and effects no inherent necessity can be demonstrated either. Yet the causal law is a condition precedent and necessary for the existence of thinking beings. The necessity, however, is logical and not sensorial. Causality, understood thus, means regular succession of antecedent and consequent, such that a specific change in one thing at one moment is followed by a specific alteration in the same or another thing at another moment. This implies continuity and connexion between cause and effect, and we should like to believe although we cannot always show that causes are related to effects in such a way that the causes produce, determine and explain the effects'. Novelty accordingly means, a hitherto unobserved potential in the cause, or relation which formerly did not occur. Vedānta says, the 'effect is nothing but the cause modified and in consequence the effect is known when the cause is known (completely), the desired knowledge of all things resulting from the knowledge of one-thing is possible and appropriate²'. This belief in the logical necessity of the intrinsic (organic) relation between cause and effect is known as Sat-karya vada (सत्कार्यवाद.) Those who deny this intrinsic thought-necessity in the relation between cause and effect and maintain that there is production of a radically new order of existence from its cause and disparate from it, throw a far heavier strain upon our belief. Even they cannot assert that there is no capacity (Sakti) on the part of the causes or collocation of

1. Śrī Vēdānta Desika maintains this view in his Rahasya-thraya sara. cf. "Our minds and their bodies": Laird, pp. 62.

2, Śrī Bhashya 1. I. 1.

causes to become an effect or effects. In which case, to become an effect would mean nothing other than passing into another condition. "Activity applied to a cause gives rise to those effect only the potentiality of which inheres in that cause." इदमकार्यापरेण तत्कार्योत्पत्तिरिति सिद्धिः Thus Asat-karya-vada is wrong and in the last resort is simply an illogical defence of novelty as if novelty means illogicality. In the light of the principle of organic or intrinsic relation, novelty is equally and more logically explained. As an argument Asat-karya-vada (असत्कार्यवाद) is self-contradictory ; as an assumption strictly pushed to its logical conclusion it leads to Sat-karya-vada. The cause-effect relation, expressed synthetically, is one of *Unity-in-distinction or difference*.

The cause of the world must be one, which contains or has within it, the potentiality of the world or of all existence. The first cause (which indeed we have to postulate and cannot help postulating) must be something ; it cannot be nothing. If non-existence be at the beginning then, that which arises from Sunya must be another Sunya.' 'तुच्छादुत्पत्तौ तुच्छमेवकार्यम् स्यात्. The Buddhistic doctrine of absolute momentariness, which perhaps Buddha taught as a disciplinary measure as Ramanuja hints, in order to abandon the changing flux of experience in order to devote oneself to the fundamental issues of moral life, which unfortunately they have converted into a metaphysical creed, led them into either mere Representationism or its consequence and *cul de sac*, Solipsism, or else to the final consummation of Scepticism and Nihilism. Further on the doctrine of absolute momentariness the origination of the world cannot be accounted for, क्षणिकत्वपक्षे जगदुत्पत्तिर्नोपपद्यते, for immediate cessations of experience (existence) after appearance mean that before the effect had been or could be, the cause is not, and in that intermediate stage there is neither cause nor effect nor even a passing of one into the other. Thus there can be firstly, no effectuation or passing into one another, secondly, there is nothing which can become something, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, thirdly, this is not true to experience at all, for we do not see cessations of existence though we certainly experience the passage of one

form into another form or avastha. The Cause or the First cause, therefore, must be the material from which and of which this world is an effect. The effect is a *process*, and not a particular *state*, and the whole process must in a sense be treated as the effect of the cause. Only then can any definite knowledge be gained as to the nature of the cause. And if we do maintain that the cause is the ultimate potential of all these Real differences then we cannot know the whole except through the knowledge of the highest evolute or the last term, that is the Ultimate Spirit or Brahman as completely manifested in the evolutionary unfoldment. Samkhya and Yoga schools accept Sat-karya-vada. According to them, "the effect is an entity, because a non-entity can never be brought into existence, because of the determinate relation between the cause with the effect, because everything cannot be possible by any and every means, because a competent cause can do only that for which it is competent, and lastly because, the effect is non-different from the cause." (Samkhya karika 9.61.) From this they infer that the world-cause is that which is the material substance, subtle, unintelligent, the inferred Pradhnaam. This material substance is capable of revealing its potentialities of differentiation in the very subtle form of three qualities or gunas of sattva (harmony) rajas (activity and passion) and tamas (passivity, darkness and evil). These three gunas are in equilibrium. But by the Sannidhanam or transcendental nearness to the Purusha being thrown into inequilibrium it evolves its effects in the serial order of Mahat, ahamkara, the subjective organs which reveal the beauties of the world to the passive spectator namely, manas, the five organs of sense and five organs of action and the objective nature namely, the subtle ground (tanmatras) and the five elements'. All these are material categories (tattvas) and only the Purusha the intelligent inactive witness, the *inferred* separate being, who constituting the spiritual entity and principle, explains the somewhat characteristic property of intelligent unfoldment in the creation of the universe, and even a purposive direction of

1. मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः महदाद्यं प्रकृतिरविकृतिः व्यस्ततः ।

बोद्धव्यस्य विकारो न प्रकृतिर्बोविकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ Sam. Karika, 3

its thrustings ; for the Prakriti capable of activity by itself evolves the world for the experience and delight of the Purusha, and not for her own sake as she is non-intelligent¹. These two entities, or rather final principles, are the ultimate reals. Though in a recent exposition of Samkhyan theism², the dependence (paráarthatvāt) of Prakriti on Íśvara is sought to be proved, the orthodox opinion had been that there is no God for Samkhya, and even if there be one as in the Patanjala-Yoga doctrine, he is not an immanent God, not a God that real theism requires and demands of him.

The ultimate cause, *causa materialis*, is Pradhána and the *causa efficiens* or rather *causa instrumentalis*, is the samyoga of Purusha and Prakriti, where the Purusha is a mere unimplicated spectator (śákshī) unnecessary to the whole process, but necessary at least, in the sense of being a spectator of the drama for the drama to be. In Samkhya then, non-implication of the Purusha is its sorest point, as all activity, even of conscious or cognizant activity (Buddhi), is relegated to the unintelligent principle Prakriti, which cognizes, unfolds, for the sake of an unenjoying (niráśraya) intelligence,³ which is mere intelligence, just as a dinner table is kept full of excellent dishes for the enjoyment of one who cannot enjoy. Thus Samkhya is unsatisfactory not in so far as its evolutionary process is concerned (I. iv. 3), but in so far as that system has no real place for intelligence and where it declares it to be necessary it is most unnecessary, and that exactly is the sorest point involving self-contradiction. The inference which Samkhya draws that the Purusha is, whilst it maintains that there is no implication of it in the process is illogical, and founded on the false principle that he is chinmátram, mere intelligence, which might be shrouded by and destroyed in char-

1. Sam. Karika, 17.

2. Theism in Samkhya A. K. Majumdar. Modern Review. feb-mar. 1927.

3. In Samkhya, the interest of Purusha (púrushártha) is served not by the intelligence, but by the teleology immanent in the Prakriti (which is unintelligent. Samkhya hopes that this immanent teleology, like the blind-will of Schopenhaur, is able to guide evolution along the best lines, or even like the Von Hartmannian Unconscious.

acter by, perhaps, mixture or alliance with matter, or else for a further reason, that if the Purusha is at any time implicated in the process he could never get out of it. The latter reason the Sámkhyaans present as the why of their not accepting the implication of Purusha in the material unfoldment. If we can show that the cause of the world, i.e., the *causa efficiens* is really an effective intelligence than the Samkhyan samyoga, and that the intelligence is implicated though never destroyed or transformed in character as intelligence it is, then we would escape a logical and empirical pit-fall. Matter can never have the power to intelligent activity, indeed for *any* activity. Matter exists for another, and has its root-ground in another, for which it exists as a dependent existence. It is 'paravaśya,' subject to another, or to the Highest Brahman or the Para. Matter's existence is dependent on an intelligence which enjoys it and guides it to its own ends, and gives it the dignity of an actual effective existence or reality. In Samkhya, however, we are face to face with an unreconciled dualism between matter and spirit. And the causal sequence also stands without explaining the origination or otherwise of the spirit, or matter. There are two causes standing in the mid-air.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika accept like Samkhya, this clear cut dualism between matter and Spirit. It postulates the material substance in the form of atoms (anus) which are of four kinds with the exclusion of the atoms of akasa, which is conceived to be the underlying substance of the ether of space.' There are also infinite number of spiritual points (ūtmanas) which are capable of consciousness in conjunction with matter or the world made of material anus or atoms, in combination at the will of Īśvara. God thus becomes an effective *causa efficiens* of the universe. But even this bringing together of these material and spiritual entities is actuated by an immanent principle of Adrishta, which is said to be in action in the primary motions on the part of the atoms and of the manas. (II-ii-11.) "अद्वैतसिद्धयर्थं वायोस्तिर्यग्गामनप्रवृत्तयोऽप्यत्र"

1. cf. Hindu Realism: J. Chatterjee says that atoms, is not the correct translation of anus, which are points having neither spacial or characteristic features. Hence an apparent comparison with Democritus is not sustainable.

कर्मेत्यद्वयकारितानि. But in bringing this principle of Adrishta as quite different from God, just like the principle of Justice or Pre-established Harmony of Leibniz, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is giving no real efficiency but instrumentality to God which because there is intelligent arrangement perceivable in the world, is brought in to be an omnipotent power to effectuate the mutual putting together which the principle of Adrishta is incapable of doing. Thus it follows that once creation has been set in motion, the world will go on as a clock, Īśvara being no longer necessary. Such a God is not of the world, such a God is the God of Deism, an external agent. However compared to Sāṃkhya, the efficient cause of the World in Vaiseshika is more effective, because centred in an intelligent being unlike the former's material causality of the unintelligent, and the slender *causa instrumentalis* of mere nearness or samyoga. All the same, the defect is quite apparent in this theory also : not only is there no immanence, it is a mechanical evolution, having no value, where if at all, Īśvara would interfere with the process constantly enough. "But in the world of creation, the things do not appear to be produced at any one moment by any particular person at any particular time," (1-i-3.) since it is a process. In the case of its being constantly interfered with, the Occasionalism of Guilenx will be the resultant. And this none can admit, who believes in the immanent teleology of the Universe. "The constant interference on the part of an external (creator) cause is wholly opposed to the notion of divine immanence in things," and unless one is going to lift this mere externality to one of transcendent immanence in the processus of creation, it will ever remain an unsatisfactory solution of not only the causal problem, but also of the notion of God as divinely immanent in this creation of His. The value of the denial of mere blind teleology of Prakritic creation, and the refutation of mere externality of the intelligent creator as in Nyāya-Vaiseshika, lies exactly in their refutation : for Īśvara must not only be the immanent but the transcendent cause of the world. The reason, however, for the Nyāya postulation of the External creator lies in the dictum that the effect is different from the cause and is absolutely a new and disparate production, hence the non-implication of Īśvara in the

world-process which is of the character of an 'effect.' Nyáya-Vaiśeṣika theory is based on Asat-karya vada and on *mere difference*.

We have already shown why the intelligence is non-implicated in the world-process in Samkhya-Yoga, because it took to identity between cause and effect. This truth is what the Vedanta of Ramanuja and indeed all schools of Vedanta accept. This of course, is, as will be showed,¹ only one half of the theory of Causality according to Ramanuja. Matter is the ultimate constituent of existences in Samkhya, and spirit is a necessary appendage. Samkhya realises that even the unfolding of Prakriti in its own right, is reasonable only if it be *for the sake of a sentient subject*. The object exists for a subject, this is a truth that Samkhya realises and fully aware of. Vedanta wedded to no such absurd dictum of pure difference as Nyáya, tries to justify the view that the material (upádana) and efficient (nimitta) cause of the world is Brahman. Vedanta accepts Sat-karya vada or the identity and intrinsic and organic relation between cause and effect.

Considering first Advaita in respect of this special problem, Advaita postulates that before the world began, no difference was manifest, everything was shrouded in *mrithyu* or Death. Not that there was a mere void, Sunya, for then causes and effects were in their seminal condition of unmanifestedness. Of course, this is exactly the position held by the Samkhyans. Causes and effects are eternally existent. All causes in their causation destroy their previous manifestation in introducing their present manifestation, for the same cause cannot exist in two forms at the same time. But the cessation of the previous manifestation does not mean the cessation of the cause itself. The clay for a moment leaves its lump form, and passes into the pot-form, but does not cease to be clay all the same. And further, the effect is also an eternal existent, for the effect-form does not accidentally emerge into existence but is eternally existent 'for if the effect is not potentially existent in

1. See conclusion.

the cause no amount of exertion can bring it forth and through "no activity can the non-existence of the effect become existent, as little as the son of a barren woman can be made existent by any effort¹." Thus it follows that the effect is identical with the cause कारणादनन्यत्कार्यम् and consequently the whole world is an effect of Brahman, as such they also are identical. So far as the former half of the statement is concerned we agree, but as to the transference of this relation between the World and Brahman, whilst maintaining that Brahman is real and the world (effect) is unreal, considered even in a transcendent sense, we are not disposed to agree. According to Sankara (whose attachment to monism was incomparable) with his peculiar monistic bias, Ékatvār oneness is real, but plurality or nánátva is unreal, and is due to avidya, or in other words, Plurality is the *unreal* effect of the Ékam or One, the *real* cause. This plurality, indeed, is the effect produced by Máya, or the principle of division and difference which are illusions and is the power of the Lord or Íśvara. "Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearance of animate and inanimate beings. Máya thus constitutes the upádana, the material cause of the world, or if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Máya belongs to Brahman as a Sakti—we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Máya. In this latter quality, Brahman is more properly called Íśvara, the Lord²."

This leads to the following positions by parity of reasoning:—

1. If this principle of individuation and differentiation, which is also the principle of illusion, has any residence it must be in Brahman. And if Brahman is mere consciousness (chinmátram), then it may even completely hinder its shining out, even through distorted ways, not to speak of the annihilation of Intelligence or consciousness itself.

1. Deussen's Philosophy of Vedanta

2. Śankara Bhashya. Sacred books of the East, Vol, 1, introduction

2. Though it be held that this power of Brahman, is not the same as Brahman himself, according to the rule 'the power of the existent is not the existent, even as the power of the fire is not the fire'. Yet this *power* and *the ground of this power* are organically united it must be admitted. But is it so admitted, for such an admission would involve the serious deduction that Brahman is imperfect, not what he is represented to be, the unconditioned pure existence uninvolved in Process ? this process though it be due to Avidya.

3. If this Sakti be Māya, and that again in turn be due to Avidya it means in other words, characterising Brahman as essentially unknowable since the whole world we know, of, is poised on illusory principles. It may even lead to the indirect utterance that if the plurality that we know is unreal, the metaphysical mania towards a very unadulterated Ēkatva, is also an unreality. In so far as the undifferenced Brahman is real, so far and so far only, the differenced Brahman is real. That this sometimes is the opinion of Sankara also can very well be granted.

What really follows from such an assertion as that is that for Advaita, the cause alone is real, the effects are unreal, and what is that but the recanting of the Sat-karya-vada which says that causes and effects are eternal atleast, that the effect, Karya, is sat or real and true. In reality what the advaitins of the Māyavada type assert is Sat-Karana-Vada and not Sat-karya-vada. In which case, there is no causal problem for Māyavāda at all².

The school of Bhaskara, on the other hand, which tried to mediate between Advaita of Māyavada and Ramanuja, says that the cause as well as the effect is real, and that there is *identity and difference* (bhēda-abhēda) between them, but it believes that the effects are due to limiting adjuncts (upādhis) which condition the one cause. The multiplicity of the world (the effect) is due to upādhis, Brahman is the Sole Real and

1. K. C. Bhattacharya : Studies in Vedāntism. Cal. Uni.

2. cf. Study of Patanjali. Dr. S. N. Das Gupta,

absolute existence. Brahman appears as many individuals due to this principle of individuation, just as ether contained in a pot is different from and yet identical with the ether outside being continuous with it. There is thus identity (abhèda) demonstrated between Ákáśa and Ghatákaśa.

But the argument that refuted the previous theory refutes this also, in spite of the fact, that this really follows Sat-Karya-vada. There is in Bhaskara's theory as in Advaita, two entities, Brahman the cause, and the Upádhis which make it differentiated, as against Avidya and its consequent Máya in Advaita. The upádhis are not explained just as the indescribable Avidya and still more indescribable Máya, are also unexplained, though in both the cases, they explain the differences. And just as in the other case, the upádhis must have their abode in Brahman, if not so their abode is nowhere. And since release consists in getting rid of Máya in the one case, and upádhis in the other, in the former case, Brahman the intelligent would suffer from illusion and ignorance, as in the latter, Brahman the unlimitable and the unlimited, the indivisible would be limited and divided., and in neither case, can there be release if the eternal (sanātana) Avidya and Upádhis have their seat in Brahman, and if not there ballasted from reality where would they reside?—If knowledge of reality and release is the aim of all spiritual effort as they themselves claim, then there is no getting out of the bond of Upádhis or Avidya with the help of these theories, not to speak of a logical explanation of the problem of truth and reality, which overtly or covertly deny relations and qualities to the Absolute. Bhaskara no doubt grants Saguna Brahman unlike Advaita and refutes in his Bhashya the Mâyavádin and his Nirguna Brahma-vāda.

From what has followed from the above ;

1. The unintelligent cannot be the cause of the world. (2.iii.1.) The intelligent alone must be the cause of the world, it alone is the 'womb' as the Sutra says. (1.iv.28. and Mun. up. 1.1.6.) for by no means can the non-intelligent explain the processes, its *direction* and final *end*. Brahman according to the deepest instincts of mankind, or rather shall we say, the firm-ground intuitions

and religious ideals is nothing less than the entire cause, namely, the material or immanent and efficient or transcendent cause of the world. If Brahman were merely an operative cause of the universe like the Naiyāyic Isvara that is the God of Deism, or the mere remover of obstacles being himself all-perfect and all-governing as in the Pātanjala Doctrine, the knowledge of the entire world would not result from the knowledge of Brahman : not any more than we know the pot when we know the potter or vice versa. यदि निमित्तकरणमेव जगतो ब्रह्म, तदा तादृशज्ञानं समस्त जगद्विज्ञानं स्यात् । यदि कुलालादि विज्ञानेन घटादि विज्ञायते. Brahman, just as the God of Spinoza, further is the immanent cause of the universe and because there is glory and beauty revealed in the process of unfoldment, there is evidence of an end which can only be that of an activity of Spirit. Ends to which the universe of process thrusts to are not to be relegated to matter, or energy "which are mere *entia rationis*," but to spirit or world-reason. And no evolutionary process can be explained without the concept of end. So much so even the sutras suggest that the world is for the sake of kaivalya and for the lila of God लोकेवच्छु लीलैकैवल्यम् (II-1-33) All philosophical explanation must look to the concept of end, be it ever so much as an attainment or self-revelation of character. Perfection of character in the beings animate consists in the enlargement of their sphere of consciousness or rather intelligence so as to attain and appreciate in greater degree the entire relations and end of the world-process. The destiny of the World or Jagat is spiritual—is Spirit.—Brahman is thus the goal—the final End. And as Nature in entirety as with the souls depends for its *being* on Brahman, understood in the light of the concept of end, they form his modes or body (śarīra).

The relation between cause and effect is organic and intrinsic and sat-karya-vada is right and it is the postulate that is acceptable to logic. The acceptance of this position is the thorny spot in the Advaita of Māyavāda and the bheda-bheda theories, which when strictly applied leads the former to the thrilling anti-climax in the swing of the pendulum of chit-svarupa Brahman. Indeed Brahman according to Advaita, is as unreal as Māya. It leads to the śūnya

of Madhyámika metaphysics. If this relation, that is, Satkaryaváda should be loyally adhered to, and if a static Eleatic Being should be denied, then, the effect is as real or as unreal as the cause, and if He be really the cause and real by himself, then the reality of the World is equally established. The totality of cause (Brahman with unmanifest Nature) is identical with the totality of effect (Brahman with manifest Nature.)

Yet regarding the perfection of Brahman, the cause, though equally as real as the effect, is yet superior to that of the effect or Nature in its power of transcendence. All confusion arises from the confusion between the different conceptions of reality and perfection as Prof. S. Alexander writes in his '*Basis of Realism*.' "Physical things are as real as mind but not as perfect. When we speak of degrees of Reality we must be careful to ask whether we do not mean degrees of perfection." And in differentiating between the reality and perfection of a thing we really apprehend that the cause has more perfection than the effect. In order to make clear that such indeed is the view of Ramanuja, it is well to show an instance. He says that dreams are not unreal. "The conscious states experienced in dreams are *not* unreal ; it is only, their objects that are false ; these objects only, not conscious states, are sublated by the waking consciousness."¹ He further says that not only dreams but even perceptual illusions, mirage, and hallucinations are as cognitions true. "The cognition of silver in the shell is a true one."² The difference between their perfection and those of the conscious states lies in their non-utility and their non-coherence with normal life and experience. The sublation of those experiences consists in their actual utility or non-value and not of their experiential character. The waking state does not slay the existence of the lower. Accepting as a matter of fact that the material world is less perfect, since its meaning is only had through a mind, and its value which makes it a *truth* dependent upon logical cognizing and valuing—not that its existence is dependent upon mind and least of all minds, is its

1. Sri Bhashya 1-1-1. (pp. 75 and 119-124 : trans.)

2. Ibid (pp. 120),

only in this particular peculiar sense that to be the 'cause' is to be capable of *conditioning* another existence which then will be regarded as its 'effect.' Thus wherever there is an operative centre for a force to manifest or wherever a will manifests, that may be considered to be its body then. The manifestation of power and evolution takes place in nature, and through minds functioning in nature, under the aegis of Spirit. "The world and the minds are the body of the Spirit."¹

"He of whom the earth is the body, of whom water is the body, of whom the fire is the body, of whom the mind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of whom death (mrityu) is the body, he is the inner self of all, the divine one, the one God Nārāyanā "(Subala. Upa)" He who dwelling within the self whom the self does not know, of whom the self is the body, who rules the self from within, He is thy ruler within, the Immortal" (Brih. Upa. 3-7.3-22).

Ramanuja says, that the relation between Brahman and the Universe is an eternal relation, and one term cannot be stressed without stressing the other term too legitimately. Brahman is the cause, and is the condition of the effect, namely the Universe (jagat), for its being what it is. Without his volition (iccha) nothing can take place (I. 1. 3). The undistinguishable darkness (Tamas)² of Pralaya, the whole or the One Īkam, is the condition of the reality. It is the condition when these manifestations are drawn in even as the tortoise legs are drawn in, and is so subtle to be never a fact of experience, where the sentient souls are suppressed from valuing according to their relative largeness of intelligent activity or consciousness. This inferred state or avastha of Brahman is undistinguished and undistinguishable by us. It is the absolute sleep of nature and is the con

1. अतस्तत्त्वैव चिदचिद्वस्तुतया तत्प्रकारम् ब्रह्म.

2. तमसि च स्वशरीरतयापि पृथार्थेद्विज्ञानर्हाति सूक्ष्मदशापस्या स्वात्मशेकनामापन्ने सति, तन्माभूततमदशरीरं ब्रह्म, पूर्ववद्विभक्त नामरूपचिदचिन्मिश्रं प्रपञ्चशरीरं स्यामिति सङ्कल्प्याप्यक्रमेण जगच्छरीरतया आत्मानं परिणामतीति सर्वेषुवेदान्तेषु परिणामोपदेशः

sequence of the involutive impulse of its Lord. The will to manifest on the part of Brahman, is the condition that lets this evolution start its usual run. "That which is Being, i.e., this world which now owing to distinctions of names and forms bears a manifold shape was in the beginning one only owing to absence of distinctions of names and forms" सदेवसोम्य इदमग्रमासीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम् or even there were no other beings functioning, Náráyāna was the only existent. एकोऽहवै नारायणासीत् न ब्रह्म नेषाणो नेमाद्यवापृथिवि न नक्षत्राणि नापो नाग्निर्नसोमो नसूर्यः स एकाकि नरमेत तस्य ध्यानास्तस्य. (Mahá Náráyana Úp. 1. 1.) The differentiation which takes place in beings animate and inanimate, is an effectuation willed at a "determinate" beginning by the spirit or Brahman, who is the complete owner or ruler of the Universe or Jagat., and guiding nature which is in its furled or coiled state of potential such that distinction could not be forecast on its unevolved surface. For Ramanuja, the effect is the cause made manifest, distinct with the evolution of real differences and emergences and plurality, that is, distinct with names and forms. For such an evolution, the effect is dependent on its cause ; it is sustained by the cause since the effectuation is not like a particular painting ; it is a gradual unfoldment, a process in time ; since, the primal state—an inferred potential—contains not only the possibility of the present 'this,' or 'now' and the 'then' and the 'had-beens,' but also the 'hereafter' the final goal that is itself as completed in actuality. Whilst treating the 'now' and the 'then' as imperfections you cannot by any means treat them as unreal. It is imperfect surely, but unreal it is not.

According to the definition already given, the body (śarīra) of the cause would certainly be the effect, of the dependence, of the sustenance, and of the enjoyment, of the Cause or Spirit in it. The activity of real enjoyment is an action of real manifestation of self or self-expression, and the effectuality of an existence lies in its self-expression. Ramanuja maintains that the activity of manifestation is an activity of divine impulsion of his own glory and not merely one of such character that makes others say that such a God is silly God, if not a cynical player of an unworthy game. Further such a manifestative impulse is to make the

individual selves realise the glory of the world and of Himself, the perfect, in and through them. For him, as for the several selves, to *be* is to manifest; in the one, it is a manifestation of divine glory and eternal values through the selves whom he helps towards a greater approximation to perfect functioning and appreciation of reality: for the other, the whole functioning of the universe, its unfoldment of nature, is for the gradual evolution of their spiritual character; in a word, this universe or Nature (Prakṛiti) is the Sphere they shall more and more subjugate and utilising spiritualise, and use the power behind themselves and behind nature. It is at once the barrier and the help towards their perfection. It is a "vale of soul-making."

It has been shown, firstly, that according to Védānta of Ramanuja, the cause of the universe is ultimately 'Spirit-and-matter, for as the statement goes "Brahman only, and with it Prakṛiti as ruled by Brahman, is the cause of the world" and not any *one* of them without the other. In the beginning then, the two primary entities of matter and spirit were manifesting themselves, the spirit controlling the matter. (Sri-Bhashya 1-1v-22) परमेव जगत्कारणम्, न पुरुषस्यद्विस्तिथ च प्रकृति स्तितान्. Sāmkhya is right in postulating Prakṛiti to be the ultimate material cause of the universe, the impulsion or the efficient cause however, being the Spirit, which latter is not accepted by Sāmkhya as it does not accept the organic bond of matter with Spirit or Brahman, in which case the ultimate causality would devolve upon the *owner* of Prakṛiti or Brahman, and not on Prakṛiti *merely*. The spiritual origination of the world could be satisfied, not by any amount of Bergsonian biological imaginings or Fichtian Dialectical 'Anstoss', but only by the acceptance of matter to be nothing else than it appears to be namely, the material of which the world is made. The spiritual origination if it means anything at all, is only in this conception or rather the misapplication of the causal category with regard to the relation of those factors revealing *merely* dependence and in no way *derivation* of the one from the other. The spiritual prius if it means anything significantly is because of the initial directions and purposes revealed in the

process. The physical beginning as the quotation from the Sri-Bhashya suggests is only the Spirit-Matter and not any single entity among them. The Logical prius involves, however, two views ; 1stly, the inference of physical potential at the prius, 2ndly, the inference of end or goal, the full expression of spiritual purpose as in the potential physical prius. The spiritual expression as the prius would be the teleological potential which the Brahman *without* his modes *is*, the physical expression of the prius, however, would be the material (upádána) potential which the Brahman *with* his modes or Prakriti is. The teleological cause viz. Brahman or spirit alone is the efficient cause ; the physical cause namely Brahman-as-with-Prakriti, forms the material cause. And in a more definite way should it be held that of the substantial modification of the three entities that pass into another condition, the most modifiable entity in very nature (svarúpa though not in svabháva) is the matter or Prakriti. The appropriate materialism of Sámkhya lies in this fact, that the real modification of natures occurs in material constituents and not in the spiritual substances viz. the subjects whose change in nature is not substantial but only in the range of consciousness, which further is not the characteristic of the highest 'because of the superiority and intelligent nature of the Brahman and of the fact of the eternality of his perfect nature. Effect, the Bháshya defines, "as its substance passing into another state." कार्यत्वम् हि नमैकस्यद्रव्यस्यावस्थान्तराप्तिः. From this point of view even the subjects do undergo a change of state or avastha. The soul which becomes activist or kshétragna and contracted or expanded in the relative range of consciousness "is also from this point of view an effect," 'with this difference' from the Prakriti which undergoes a substantial modification in nature so as to be unrecognized from its ultimate or original natures," that the *other* condition which is represented by the soul is of different kind from that which constitutes nonsentient things such as ether and so on. The origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects and the latter or eternal". . . . "The ruling element of the world, that is, the Lord finally, who has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is at alternate periods the

embodied in all those beings in their alternating states. The two modes and he to whom those two modes belong thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition passes over into the different condition."

उभयप्रकारविशिष्टे नियन्त्रिणे तदवस्थतदुभय विशिष्टतारूपविकारो भवति; कारणावस्थाया अवस्थान्तरापत्तिरूपो विकारः प्रकारद्वये प्रकारिणि च समानः (II-iii-18.)

The subtle child-achid-viśiṣṭa Brahman passes over into the gross chid-achid-viśiṣṭha Brahman. Though operating with changing contents which reveal his own effectuating purposes namely, perfections of love, beauty and goodness, he is not in any way hampered by such an evolution of these eternal values which form his essential svabhāva, as such remains ever the constant unchanging principle "just on account of his being their inner ruler and self."

परमात्म तु तयोस्त्वचारीरभूतयोर्नियन्त्रतयात्मभूतस्तद्वत्पुरुषाभौर्विकारैश्च स्थिष्यते ।(I-iv-27.)
 "The creation of the world by God is not an arbitrary fiat of God though it must not be understood to mean anything than a free act of God. It is not anything that he might act or refrain from acting at his pleasure," for, as Sri Védānta Chārya also says, the evolution of this world is a very fundamental act of God without which he cannot be true to his nature as the Lord or Īśvara. His redemptive impulse, his superiority of Nature, his perfection and power, in a word, all that makes for power and ideal and perfect, demand this expressive functioning on his part.

जीवदत्त्यन्त विलक्षणतया प्रख्यातेन सर्वनियन्त्र पुरुषोत्तमेन ईशः । पतिं विभक्त्य धारिणि ।
 In the words of Ulrici, we can say that "In truth God is not *first* God and *then* creator of the world, but as God he is the creator of the world, and only as the creator of the world is he God. To separate the two ideas from one another is an empty abstraction, affirming at once an unmeaning difference which contradicts the unity of the divine nature. Hence just as God does not *become* creator of the world but *is* from eternity creator of the world, so the world too though not eternal of itself exists from eternity as the creation (or act) of God." This passage expresses the same view as that of Ramanuja and refutes such metaphysic as is placed on mere difference of the Dvaita and such unreal metaphysic as the Sankarite abstractionism and cloudy

monism of the western idealists. Ramanuja affirms the eternality of the Prakriti and individual selves which constitute the universe or Jagat in their subtle or gross form, as eternally bound in an organic union (without which relation of absolute dependence they would be mere abstractions), to Brahman. This proves the eternality of cause and effect, also in this way, that all the expected consummations or "compossibles" would be potential in the initial condition of the undistinguished.

THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION

OR

COSMOLOGY

The historical perspective or method for unravelling of the origin, or rather, the enigma of a determinate beginning of the world is certainly actuated by a true scientific impulse. If the beginning (becoming) of the world has really been infinite no amount of history will bring us nearer to its origin ; "it is vain to sound the bottomless abyss of the past with the puny plummet of science". But if we do grant that things had an origin (in time), and their history a beginning, then we escape from the implications of the false historical method, viz. that 'becoming' or change only exists, in which case, the search for understanding evolution is vain and futile. If there had been no beginning, there certainly could be no end, and no end to where we arrive at the end—no perfection, and hence no meaning in evolving. The vindication of a determinate beginning and a real origin as the presupposition of any historical account, commits us to the doctrine of a beginning of the world, atleast, of the present order of things, and gives us a hope of attainment of a perfected order at the End. All real efforts at a metaphysic yield the conception of a unitary principle or substance, from which all creation proceeds towards an attainment of a perfected End. The effort at such a conception is nothing more than an effort, and if the historiological impulse were anything, then we can *prima facie* accept and not criticise, except for the purpose of demonstrating the strict logical sequence of evolution, from the assumptions basic and integral to that system, and in our case of the Vedānta of Ramanuja.

It has been explained in the previous chapter, that there is non-difference between the totality of cause and totality of effect and what takes place is only a revelation of behaviour of the cause in time-series and space, because the *sukshma chidachid-viśiṣṭa* Brahman passes over (*parināmayati*) into *sthula-chidachid-viśiṣṭa* Brahman, the undifferenced becomes differenced into names and forms (*nāma-rupa*).

The cause of the world, has been said to be Brahman,¹ in so far as he is the Lord (Īśa), sustainer and controller (niyantar) of the Prakṛiti (matter) and the jīvas, to whom he stands in the relation of soul (śarīrin), and to whom they stand in the relation of body (śarīra). In this sense of eternal relation, and ownership and this ownership being never disjunctable (aprathīksiddha), Brahman, the supreme Spirit, is the absolute cause of the Universe (jagat), and not in any other sense. (I.iv.1.) Cause and effect are as eternally related as soul and body, and it is a unity-in-difference. Identity is a misleading expression though not wrong. If we prefer to use that word at all, we must be careful not use it in the meaning of Advaita; further, our way of putting it has a synthetic note about it, which surely, the causal relation is. It is a cause-effect continuum.

The original state or condition of Brahman, or cause is stated to be at some places, as Sat, or mere Brahman with none else, or it is stated to be Asat. "The highest Self, which in its nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss, has for its body all sentient and nonsentient beings—instruments of sport for him as it were—in so subtle a form, that they may be called nonexistent; and as they are his body, he may be said to consist of them (tanmaya)." (I.iv.27).² "Because the whole body of other things is spoken of as Asat or nonexistent on account of particular attributes not being manifest, of being absolutely dependent"³ The truth of the statement that there was Asat only means, that the universe was in a such a condition of absorption that they, as it were, were not. It certainly was not a Sunya.⁴ Then his involutive power being manifest (samhāra iccha), He alone was.

Thus God through his willing the creation as also involution, and of the complete control he has eternally upon them, becomes by these two facts, the upādāna and nimitta kāraṇa of

1. Śrī Bhāṣya I. i. 2. "Janmādaya yatah".

2. Śrī Bhāṣya I. iv 27.

3. Mādhva Bhāṣya II. i. 18.

4. Nor was there Asat; there was gloom." Rg. Veda. X. (129,)

the universe. The Sámkhyan evolutionary hypothesis is accepted by Vedánta and wherever it differs from it, it is only when it is absolutely necessary for its metaphysical theory.

Sámkhyan evolutionary theory postulates Matter or Pradhána as the Mulam (origin or source) or the first cause, out of which all nature (vaisvarupya) evolves due to its own immanent desire to please the Purusha, to whom it is near. Its three gunas are the eternal constituents of every one of matter's categories viz. Mahat (also known in Sámkhya as the Buddhi the instrument of ratiocination), Ahamkára (which with the manas and the gnánénindriyas forms the Antahkarana), tanmátrás and also the gross elements. So much so, Sámkhya is also known as guna-parináma-váda. Except Prakriti which contains these three gunas in equilibrium, in a very subtle condition, the rest of the categories are in an unequilibrated condition due to preponderance or lessening of the gunas over each other, hence they are known as vikáras or modifications. Prakriti first passes over into mahat on its contact with Purusha, consciousness of willing (icchá-shakti) being manifest at that stage in matter. It is the initial drive in the original matter to distinguish itself, standing thus as the cause of ahamkára, the particular principle of individuation or centrism, a tendency visible in all matter. At this stage, perhaps as B. G. Tilak says, it can be compared to be the beginning of the Naiyyayic atom or Anu¹. This ahamkára represents a definite cleavage-product standing as the vast triple divisioned chaos of atomic bed. Here we have three kinds of ahamkára viz, Sattva, (called the vaikārika), Rajas (called Taijasa), Tamas (or the Bhutādi) respectively forming the three kinds of self-assert tendency. And with the rajasic and sattva ahamkāras there is splitting of the general evolution into two branches viz. the subjective and the objective, which latter, is mainly the tamasic product and perhaps a little of rajas. Deviating from the main line, ahamkára (sattva and rajas) develops manas and the ten indriyas of sense and action. Splitting from the main tree, the Bhutādi of the tamasic cord develops the five subtle tanmátrás,

1. *Gita Rahasya*. B. G. Tilak. (Telugu. Trans. 235 Chap. VIII.)

which inturn evolve the five gross elements of other (akāśa), air (vāyu,) fire (agni) water (āpas), earth (annam or prithvi). The last five gross elements standing in no causal relation to any others they are called Vishayas or vikritis. By the intermixture and combination of these five elements according to the blind teleology immanent in Prakriti, the world of nature, a beautiful enjoyable but changing creation, evolves. This, in short, is the Samkhyan theory of evolution. Mulaprakriti is the effect of nothing else. Buddhi, ahamkāra and the five tanmātras are both effects and causes of other things, the eleven indriyas including the manas, and the five gross elements are effects, Purushas are neither causes nor effects of anything, they are mere chinmātra-svarupa sakshins (mere witnessing intelligences or consciousness).¹

The Vedāntic view of Ramanuja, however is, that prakriti being subject to the will of Brahman and standing in a dependent relation to him as body (śarīra), is an effect of his, in which case, the primary denotation of the word Mulam, would go to Him and not to prakriti, the dependent existence. The term Avyakta, thus, would apply to the causal condition of Brahman, who controls, sustains and enjoys the creation (I. iv. 2.)². Further of this dependence of matter on Brahman, which Sāmkhya does not admit, Ramanuja refutes it only in so far as it does not admit the 'parāvaśyata' on Brahman is concerned, and by no means intends to deny Unevolved matter and its manifestations or modifications *in themselves*³. Pradhānam, if it has got any ends to subserve which Sāmkhyans assert that it does, then it is only in this dependent relation as fulfilling his ends, as his body that "pradhāna and so on are capable of accomplishing their several ends" (I. iv. 3.) Otherwise, the different essential natures of them all could never exist nor act, much less their activities be (II. ii. 1-5). Further, the activity of prakriti would have to be construed as something like the

1. मूलप्रकृति रविकृति सैद्धान्त्य प्रकृतिर्विकृतिवयस्सतः।

शोदस्य विकारो नप्रकृति नैविकृति पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥ (*Samkhya Karika verse 3.*)

2. B. G. Ch. 8. (v. 3-21.) Sri Bhāshya. I iv. 23.

3. Sri Bhāshya. I. iv. 3.

blind Schopenhaurian will, or the Von Hartmannian Unconscious, which can never explain the intelligent evolution of the world. And only a pessimist will deny the intelligent unfolding of the world-process to whom the intelligence is only a very novel and out of the way product and not the reverse, and intelligence would be as Haeckel conceived and as the behaviourist conceives it today, only as due to neurological and cortical reaction to environment.

Though one has to suffer for anthropomorphic beliefs one is bound to hold, and which as Prof. Schiller says, everyone is confined to, the only alternative being to prefer a good one to a bad one ; "in the beginning was Spirit, not temperament or whim, not feeling or arbitrary will, lies at the root of (creation) world-process, but Divine Intelligence, the Logos is the prime ground of all things. Reason as the rule and not-reason or chance, as the exception in this world we can understand, but the reverse we cannot comprehend. Regularity is found in nature as there is Spirit, world-reason in it. The process of nature takes place according to strict mathematical principles—more *geometrico* as Spinoza would say'".

Thus it is for Vedanta, Brahman is the first cause, the ultimate category from which everything evolves. The evolution of the world in the order of unfoldment is spoken of² in various ways in the Upanishads, "From paramâtman ether ; from ether air, from air fire ; from fire water ; and from water earth were generated". This sequence of elementary distinctions of the Bhutâdi is due to the subtle Prakriti manifesting more and more grossly (though not wholly as it is infinite)³, in its descendent wave, and finally attaining the grossest form of earth, water being subtler than earth, fire more than water, air more than fire and ether of Space more than air, and Prakriti is subtler than all these.

1. *Philosophical tendencies of the Present day.* L. Stein Vol. iii pp. 429—430.

2. आत्मना आकाशसंभूतः आकाशाद्वायुः, वायोरग्निः, अग्रेरपः

अन्नाः पृथिवी । पृथिव्या ओषधिव्योऽन्नम् । Taitt. up. 2. 1.

3. Sankhya says that even whilst the Prakriti evolves it does not completely pass over into another condition. A fragment of it alone manifested as the sensorium. *Bhagavad Gita* agrees with this.

Subtler and never gross, Paramátman and átman are, than Prakriti, being spiritual. It may be as it is hinted at, that the manifestations in sequent order are due to more and more qualitative differentiation of the sensum according to the capacity of the sukshma indriyas to evolve gross physical organs, to stimulate the functioning of those organs of sensation'.

शब्द राग ओषमस्य जायते भवतात्मनः

रुपराग तथाचक्षुः त्राणम् गन्धजिह्वक्षय । Mahā Bhārata (Sānti Parva 213.)

Brahman is the cause of Prakriti's movements as it is inert *per se*. First he wills the evolution of Mahat or the cosmic greatness (it is held that this should not be treated as the Buddhi the material category as consciousness is not a material entity but the characteristic attribute or mode of the Intelligent Self). Then the second aspect is that of cosmic will-to-be-distinct and the evolution of the five primal cosmic elements of ether of Space, air, fire, water, and earth. Some people say there were only three elements : fire, water, and earth, leaving ether of space out because it is not a substance but that in which things move. This grand cosmic adjustment is prior to formation of any individual bodies or things or even worlds. This is called the general creation (advāraka srishti).

After this general creation has taken place, Brahman keeps the seed which contains the cosmic soul (which is the aggregate of individual souls who are yet under bondage or influence of Karma which has not been consummated by them in the prior creation) into the cosmic waters. And out of it is born the Golden egg, and from it the Cosmic Deity who is also known as Hiranyagharbha, is born. And from Brahma issues the whole sadvāraka srishti the special creation. As the Rg.Veda says हिरण्यवर्धस्समर्ततामे भूतस्यजातः पति रेक आसीत्. The Taittiriya text says "First arose water," which could only mean that of the gross pure

1. Speaking on the subject of the number of organs, the Sutras mention them to be eleven only. Now we are aware of only five organs of sensation and we do have organs of activity. What is maintained is that even though we may evolve more powers, *sensu eminentiori*. What really takes place is that they may be more perfect but a divine vision must yet be a sensation of light, a divine hearing, a sensation auditional,

creation that was the first, the rest being more subtle manifestations. "Even before water there was Purusha" is another text. (Katha. Up. 2-6)¹ From this Purusha, first tejas, water, earth, and through their intermixtures all other things came about (Ch. Up. 6. 2. 6). Again it is said that from Purusha the five elements rose in order (Taittiriya. Up. 2-1). The last statement of the Taittiriya Upanishad is accepted by Vedanta Sūtras (II.iii. 1-15). Thus Manu says "In this water was placed a seed (bija) and from that arose Brahma, and from him the world arose." And further it is even said "that on subjective side the Prānas, Manas, the indriyas, and the composite elements were born."

तस्मादेतद् ब्रह्म नामरूप मग्नञ्च जायते, एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनस्सर्वेन्द्रियाणिच खं वायुर्जोतिरापः प्रिथ्वे विश्वस्य चारिणे.

There are several statements in the upanishads which speak of water or air as 'thinking', seeing, or 'brooding' and out of it issue the next category or categories. It is quite true to reason to suppose that He who is in water, whose body is the water or in air and possessor of it, thought of the evolution of the next category and produced them. The indirect and somewhat anthropomorphic if not animistic attribution of thought to the elements is not wrong at all, once we grant that there is spirit working through nature and souls, realising itself through these its own ends of delight.

Summarising the whole group of statements and placing them in the best possible perspective we have :—

1stly, a theory that never denies the Sāmkhyan evolution of the categories, indeed there is an acceptance of the evolution of the categories according to the principle "*Guṇaguneshu vartante*," in which case, we have the twenty-five categories. And as the Vedāntists accept Brahman as the cause going one step further than Sāmkhya, there are bound to be twenty-six tattvas, but the categories are considered to be effects, as such Brahman is not counted as an effect, in which case, it reduces the number of

categories by one. The number of tattvas thus remains the same in both. This theory is explicitly maintained in the *Yatindra-mata Dipika* (4th Chapter). And it is also hinted at at many places in the Bhāshya.

2ndly, there is the other theory which holds that out of Brahman, the elements in order, were manifest. And that Brahman placed a seed, and entered along *with* the individual soul (some add with Śrī or Lakshmi, the eternal partner of God) in the primal waters which developed into the golden egg and out of it arose Hiranyagharbha and after him and under his cosmic supervision the whole creation of names and forms, that is, beings and things developed. The panchêkarana or trivritkarana takes place only after Brahma is born, i.e., the five primal elements being mixed in particular proportions as to make all distinction of natures in the world. The five original elements were taken and one half of each was regarded to have been kept in tact; the other half was regarded as being divided into four equal parts, four such parts form half, which in combination with the other half produced the transformed evolute of the original element; therefore every element is in every other, the distinction lies only in the preponderating character of one element which gives it the specific name it possesses. For example, water contains all the five elements within itself but that the preponderance of the water-tattva makes it known as water; so also every other phenomenal entity. In this creation (vyashti srishti or special creation) there are no absolutely pure tattvas, but all are mixtures of the five elements and the preponderance of one entity in a substance determines as against every other, its characteristic name and form. The Vedānta Sūtras however, do not find any reason to go beyond the Chandogya Text of trivritkarana or the intermixture of the three elements which arose first (V.S. II. iv. 17-19). "Each element is indeed of a three-fold nature, owing to a primary tripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails—so that each element has a distinctive character of its own—a definite designation is given to each"

"In the scriptural account of creation preceded by intention on the part of the creator, it is said that each of these elements

was made tripartite constitution of all things is apprehended by perception as well. The red colour in burning fire comes from (primary elementary) fire, the white colour from water, the black colour from earth—in this way Scripture explains the three-fold constitution or nature of burning fire. In the same way all things are composed of elements of all kinds". "The elements possessing various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination produce living beings, not having in anyway mingled. Having combined, therefore with one another and entered into mutual associations—beginning with the principle called mahat and extended to the grossest elements—they formed an egg" etc. Having entered it into these three beings viz. fire, water, earth, with my self which is qualified by the collective soul let me differentiate names and forms,¹ i.e., let me produce gods, and all other kinds of individual beings and give them names and to that end, since fire, water and earth have now mutually combined let me make each of them tripartite and fit them for creation". The former is the meaning, says Ramanuja, of the text "that divinity thought, let me having entered these three beings with this living soul-self, differentiate names and forms—let me make each one of them tripartite."²

Thus the primary tripartition took place before Brahma was born, as he is also born from the egg, Brahman himself being the cause of the original tripartition. Further upto the creation of the Brahmānda (mundane Egg) the creation was immediate and after that, mediate (*Yat. Dipika* pp. 85)

To render these two theories of creation, synthetic complementaries of each other, we have to show that they are not contradictory but complementary and implicative of each other. We have seen that even in one of the passages extracted from the Sri Bhashya that the mahat and the other tattvas are recogni-

1. "Having created that (Hiranyagarbham, Golden Egg) he entered into it; having entered it he became 'Sat' and 'tyat', (souls and things-) Tatt., up. II. 6.,

2. Śrinivasa thinks that Trivritkarana implies Panchēkarana prakriya, and adds that others posit a septuplicatory process by combining Mahat, and Ahamkara. *Yat. Dipika* pp. 77.

DIAGRAM TO REPRESENT THE EVOLUTION OF THE TATTVAS IN SRI RAMANUJA'S PHILOSOPHY

BRAHMAN

(Who sustains, controls, and directs the Purushas and Prakriti, as such forming the immanent & transcendent, efficient and teleological cause of creation)

PURUSHAS or JIVAS (1)

(Intelligent finites grouped into one category composing the unreleased souls) Brahman places them in the primal waters and enters them as their antaryami to evolve the Golden Egg thus establishing the contact between Jivas and Prakriti

(2) TAMAS or PRAKRITI (ACHIT) (APARA)

(3) MAHAT or BHUDDHI (*cosmic*)

(4) AHAMKĀRA (*cosmic self-assertion*)

BHUTĀDI or TĀMASIC AHAMKĀRA

(9) The 5 TANMATRAS, the subtle ground of the 5 gross elements

(14) ĀKĀSA

VĀYU

AGNI

ĀPAH

PRITHVI

(the gross elements.)

RAJAS—AHAMKĀRA—SATTVA

The ground of ten sukshma organs of perception and action, (25) and Manas

HIRANYA-GARBHA or BRAHMA

who controls the evolution of the individual jivas and their physical evolution of organs, according to their Karma or adrishta, and also of the secondary tripartition (Sadvāraka Śrishti)

zed. Our only aim would be to show that the primary evolution consists of cosmic extension or growing vast (typified by the Mahat) and a cosmic attempt to differentiate on the side of Bhutadi (since the sukshma organs can only develop under the stress of the environment and reveal themselves in the bodies of souls, the which they cannot do, because the souls are not yet brought into contact with nature at all for them to assume bodies according to their karma) forming the primary elements which form the place where Brahman places the seed to develop into the Brahma and wills the panchékarana or trivritkarana. After Brahman enters the cosmic waters *with* (and not *as* as the advaitins hold) the seed containing the individual souls, the individual contact between the souls and Prakriti, is established, the Brahmánda with its world within its bosom, gets established in sequence. In this special creation, each soul attracts to itself such forms as God wills, which of course, is dependent upon his karma and according to the function he is to do in this world of creation as an instrument of God. The individual Buddhi and antahkarana and Manas with the prana are latter and belong only to the sadvāraka srishti. In either case, what is true of the general creation, the macrocosm, is still true of the microcosm; the major tripartition yields to a minor tripartition or even a septuplicatory partition ¹ as the *Yatindramata Dipika* suggests, and yet count as we may, there remain only these twenty-five categories.

The *Bhagavad Gita* accepts the view that Apra Brahman to be the lower and the individual souls as the higher. It clearly accepts the Sāmkhyan categories in the verses :

भूमिरापोऽनलो वायुः खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च ।
 अहङ्कार इतीय मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा ॥ ४ ॥
 अपरेत्यमितस्त्वन्यां प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे पराम् ।
 जीवभूतां महाबाहो ययेह धार्यते जगत् ॥ ५ ॥ B G. 7th ch.

The diagram affixed would fairly show the evolutionary process according to Śrī Ramanuja.

1. Cf. *Maha Bharata* Asva. xxxv-20—20 & xlvi-12—15.

Time (kāla) is not a myth, but a real entity, being as eternal as nature itself; not that time is nature, nor nature time, but that they are coeval. The processus of volition are both timed, and the involutive or evolutive Will (the saṁhāra and sṛishti) manifests itself or takes place accordingly.

In the world of process everything takes place according to time and cannot occur as whim would have it. Time is the master. It is maintained by Ramanuja that released souls are masters of time and everything happens as they will, according to their will to enjoyment. (Bhōga).

At the end of the present kāla (period) of evolution, which runs for a particular period, the involutive impulse of Brahman manifests itself, and the whole process gradually withdraws into the primal state passing through the very stages of descent, as it had ascended, finally resting in that very subtle condition (Tamah)¹ when it is indistinguishable from Brahman, when the souls which have not been released are in such a fragile contact with matter such that they could not function, the released souls enjoying the absorption of meditation signifying an essential unity of indistinguishableness of experience, in Karmakarya (service). Indeed in a passage, Time is said to be Brahman², in the cosmic process coeval with nature willing nature's performance in time. The whole creation first takes place subtly in the mahat (kāraṇa) before it takes place in the gross or the actual. The idea passes, in a sense, from will to fact, from potential to actual in nature.

The gradual evolution of tattvas from the subtlest Tamah, into the grosser and more defined forms in the advāraka sṛishti, yield to still more defined and individual forms in the sadvāraka sṛishti, the properties of each element partaking that of the others; thus, evolving the most complicated developments in the construction of the individual organs. The gross organs are a sequence of the contact between the subtle

1. Śrī Bhāṣya I. 1-1. (p. 125). cf. B G. VIII. 18.

2. Bh. G. XI. 32.

organs and the gross exterior on which they are subsequently built. Thus it follows that when a soul is born into this world it has a potential store of all the organs (antahkarana, consisting of the intellect, manas and the ten organs,) which manifest grossly according to the ability of the soul (which is otherwise known as Karma or adrishta, of the soul) as man, god or animal or plant or even stone¹ (III. i. 24)

And when the unreleased soul leaves its body, it carries with it the sukshma śarira or sheath, which clings to the soul as the determinant of the next birth and the tendencies which would manifest themselves then. This sukshma śarira, also known as the linga śarira, is also material, being formed by the sukshma organs and the prānas (the rajasic cleavage which forms the driving force in the organisms), and has a deeper stamp of habits upon it which form the prenatal tendencies and the peculiar constitution or mental make-up, not to be explained as the hereditary accretions of the individual. It is indeed a psychological fact that there is not only an adaptation of the bodily organs towards stimuli, but there is equally an adaptation of the psychical or mental attitude toward the same stimuli, and the mind as well as the body, tend to repeat the same responses and attitudes in the event of the same or similar stimuli recurring, unless by a volitive impulse that habitual adaptation is broken. In that direction alone can there lie release from material complexes and mental attitudes and material environments. In this sense of physical events binding us from free activity by causing habits to be formed, we can say that action binds, and added to the law of cosmic Justice, makes the definition of karma as something which binds. And only when our actions are divine i.e., according to the will of God and tuned to universal ends or offered as gifts or service to God, do they lose the sting of bondage ; Karma then never binds, न कर्म लिप्यते नरे (Isha. up. 2).

It is this Sukshma or linga sarira that hinders the self from its own natural and free volitive impulse and self-luminosity.

It may not be out of place to briefly sketch, the difference between Advaita and Viśishtādvaita, with respect to this

1. *Yat. Mata Dīpikā* and *Mahā Bhārata*. & V. Sūtras.

cosmological problem. For Sankara, as already remarked, these worlds are unreal effects of a real cause manifested due to the influence of māya and agnāna. It is certainly true to assert that individuals suffer from ignorance of their true status, but that God or Brahman should lend himself to this imperfection of ignorance in order to manifest these unreal worlds, even for the sake of his own enjoyment, seems too unreal a theory, of the fact that the enjoyer of the play himself loses the consciousness of his status, despite the assertion made, that the category of Brahman is uninvolved in the process and that the category of Īśvara is not affected by Māya which, in a sense, creates him¹.

1. The One undifferentenced Being overlaid by Māya, or by wearing the Māya-cloak, becomes the Īśvara, full of predications which are not real, i.e. not applicable to it *per se*; for Brahman is Nirguna.² They are only the way our intellect visualises or describes to itself the character of the illimitable Brahman. Īśvara as the wearer of Māya (māyāvacchinna) is *master* of Māya and does not become deluded by the same³. There is only *one* māya as such only one Īśvara⁴. All qualities (gunas) are interpreted to mean by advaita, as the combination of the gunic triplicity of Prakriti. But as Ramanuja says, there is difference between the gunic triplicity and the general term quality(guṇa), interpreted to mean Viśeṣhanas.

2. When Brahman is over-laid by another kind of Avidya, He appears as the infinite Jivas who *suffer* from māya and avidya. Multiplicity, variety and every differentiation is due to this avidya

1. Bhāskara in his refutation of the Māyavāda says that the attempt to make the Īśvara at one time the Great saṃsārin of the universe, the first-born of the Brahman, and at another time the over-comer of the māya just like Brahman, the person who is infinitely better than the ordinary individual, is making Īśvara the contradiction of himself. There is no more spurious and illogical explanation of the Absolute or Īśvara than this. According to him it appears that the Brahman is the Īśvara and with his two types of Achētana-Sakti and Jiva-Sakti creates the worlds, the former being really eternal, existing till pralaya, the latter a vanishing distinction, that will be absorbed at the end of his gradual evolution into the divine. Thus he argues for (Krama-mukti). Cf. *Phil. of Bhāskara* P. N. Srinivasacharya. Madras University lectures 1927.

2. साक्षि चेतावेवको निर्गुणस्य.

3. *Panehadasi*, 1. 6.

4. "Ajāmékam"

(malina-sattva-pradhānam). And it is this avidya that makes individual ahamkāras.¹ This avidya, again, is not a single entity but many and of infinite kinds, and because of that alone are there so many individual souls, subject to Māya, having, however sufficient individuality to run through a series of lives¹. Individuality (Aham) is thus characterised as a material category and identified with the Samkhyan Ahamkāra, and treated, here unlike, Sāmkhya, as a vanishing distinction, which the Purushas certainly are not.

3. The third branch of Agnānam, is the Tamah Pradhānam overlaying itself on the nirguna-chit-svarupa Brahman, who it must be carefully borne in mind, is not involved in any of these transformations or generations, gives rise to the sukshma and sthula creation of things (vritti-avacchinna and vishayāvicchinna Chaitanyam) conditioned by the vrittis or acts and states and vishayas or gross nature.

Accordingly, there is no svarupa-bhēda (difference in nature or essential character) between Jivas and Brahman and indeed, just as the sun seen in different lakes or mirrors appears as so many, Brahman deflected and reflected by antahkarana (ahamkāra and other instruments of cognition or understanding) and tamahpradhānam appears as so many jivas or subjects and things or objects respectively.² They are identical in essence.

Sri Vidyārnava describes this in a metaphorical way.³ Just as a picture during its production undergoes four stages, Brahman also undergoes four transformations. First, in the case of a picture on a clean pure white cloth is spread a particular ground (anna rasam), then it is dried. After that colour (maṣi or a parti-

1. Perhaps at that stage, if we conceive avidya as a real upādhi (not unreal, as advaita conceives it to be) the distinguishing of Brahman into jivas by such a upadic limitation would compare with Bhāskara's Theory, for to him the difference is real, and their relation is one of identity and difference; And further for him too the Brahman is Mere Chinmātrasvarupa (intelligence or consciousness.)

2. *Yat. Mala Dipika* pp 25 and note on pp 26.

3. *Panchadasi* chap. VI. ver. 1-10-

cular colour background) is painted over it. It is only after that, the picture is painted. Here, the *Suddha-sattva-Pradhānam*, which is otherwise known as *Māya*, as the first fruit of *Agnānam* or the higher phase of "*Prakṛiti*",¹ is laid in contact with Brahman, the *Sakshi* (witnessing) *chaitanyam* (consciousness), also known as the *Akhanda śuddha chaitanyam* (the infinite unconditioned and indivisible consciousness). It gives rise to the *Īśvara*, who thus becomes the *antaryāmin* (inner self) of all creation and its sustainer. And through contact with the *rajasic* division of the self-same *Prakṛiti* (which can be compared to the *maṣi* of the illustration) the *jivas* are made manifest. And by connection with the *tamasic pradhānam*, the *Virāt-rupa* of Brahman, as Nature, is manifest. All the while, during all these changes (*vikāras*) the Brahman is merely passive, on whose surface (apparently) alone beat a million waves turbulantly.

Thus creation, according to 'Advaita, is due to this imposition of *agnāna* (*Prakṛiti*) and its evolutes *Māya* and *avidya*, which as the first and second (*sattvic* and *rajasic*) gives rise to *Īśvara* and *jivas*, whilst the last or the *tamasic* evolute gives rise to the origination of Nature, it being subsequent to the first influence (*thirōdhana*) of *Māya*, under the will and control of *Īśvara*.

The above sketch is enough to show the difference between the two systems and how far they are removed from each other. The difference seems to be mainly in the conception of the *advāraka sṛishti*; the rest, namely, the *sadvāraka sṛishti*, taking place according to *trivṛtkarana* or *pañchēkarana* and *sāmkhyān tattvic* evolution.

The evolutionary hypothesis of *Rāmānuja*, is based on the scriptures and the *Pancharatras*, which describe that there are four *vyūhas* of God or four attitudes of God, one as the Lord of the *jivas* in the aggregate i.e. *Sankarshana*; the lord of the *Mahat* as the *Pradhyumna* and the *adhistāna Purusha* of the *Manas*, as *Aniruddha*. *Vāsudeva* or *Nārāyaṇa* being Brahman

¹ibid ch I. 15-16.

is himself the Supreme. A criticism of the theories of vyuhas is out of the scope of the present subject and the Sri Bhashya though it defends the *Pancharatras* whilst criticising the other orthodox schools, does not give any actual support to it in its pages.¹

Sri Ramanuja, then, accepts the reality of process, and of intelligent process. The Intelligent Cause or Spirit is always present in the process as the antaryāmi, in all beings, and every blade of grass contains him whilst none can exhaust him; as such he sustains creation by his immanent presence and transcendent governance. The derivation of real distinctions by a *real* imposition, as in Bhāskara, or by an *unreal* imposition, as in Advaita theories, only try to escape the vital problem of Discontinuity or multiplicity, with the help of the specious simplicity achievable by denying any reality to it or declaring it to be a real though a passing or vanishing phase. In Reality we never come across, as Sri Ramanuja is not tired of saying, continuity, or shall we say, a bare 'that', an uncharacterised 'somewhat'. Every presentation even the bare 'thatness' has got a distinct character making it recognizable as a 'that'.²

Matter is not continuous, but discontinuous,³ as Sir Oliver Lodge remarked. It is not as it appears to be; it is full of electrons and protons and who knows whether these atoms of electricity are still more composite of others; atleast the proton being bigger than its satellite the electron, can be reduced to a still further elemental structure. We can no more dissolve these entities into merely a continuity or into a mere vast energy or into mere 'lines of force', not only scientifically, but even presentationally we cannot achieve the continuum of bare presentation. That discontinuity is as vital as continuity or Unity cannot be denied, whether we treat one of the terms as true or false. And in so far as we cannot but bring them under

1. Sri Bhashya. II. ii. 42-43.

2. Sri Bhashya. I, i. 1.

3. *Modern Scientific Ideas* especially The Idea of Discontinuity. Sir Oliver Lodge. F. R. S. (Benn's Six penny Library).

so, the attributes or modes inevitable lead to the concept of substance and the substance leads to the concept of its modes. For, to be is to manifest to itself through its modes and attributes. They are intellectually distinguishable, that is by the intimate abstractionism inherent in all scientific thought, but not disjoinable by any means from existence.

The attempt at arriving at a substance without its attributes, because of the arbitrary dictum "that attributes lessen perfection," that to determine were to limit and to circumscribe, that to define were to use expressions which are essentially an exaggeration of what we know of that which cannot even be known, is a preordained logical failure. Spinoza, however with his rationalistic bias tried to subsume the attributes under the grand General idea of Being, but when he had no sooner reached his goal, he could not stay there, as he could never derive the attributes and modes from the mere being. Thus God was, in the one case, condemned to be a mere aggregate of subsumed particulars or modes, or facts, grouped into two causal series, or else, in the other case, it was a mere existence neither a unity of concrete character nor identity of anything. As Ramanuja points out "if Brihatva constitutes the logical genus, Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the Īśvara, sentient souls, and non-sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses (aśvatva) inheres in concrete individual horses and this contradicts all scriptural teaching (according to which Brahman is the highest Concrete entity)." एवं तर्हि ब्रह्मणोत्पत्त्यवच्छिन्नमिदं चिदचिद्वस्तुनोत्पादवर्तिमानं सामान्यामिति सकलवृत्तिस्तुतिव्यवहारविरोधः (III-11-28). But in Spinoza, as in Sankara's philosophy, "substance is reached by precisely that same process of dropping all limitation in the way of determinate qualities which gives us the Abstract. The consequence is that the derivation of less ultimate from more ultimate is beyond their reach: in which case, the less ultimate must be treated either as mere phenomena though *bene fundatum* or veridical hallucinations or that they are real but impossible as far as logic goes or could envisage, of derivation from a more ultimate being — a profession at once of the impossibility of know-

ledge. In the one case, Sankara's position results, in the other, an atomism most distended and chaotic. The former (Sankara's position) suffers more though more 'logical'—if perchance to treat an entity as hallucinatory is the same thing as 'deriving' from reality. But to be fair, Spinoza (who resembles Bhāskara more than Sankara), "rejected the bait of the specious simplicity obtainable by denying the reality of matter or of mind or of God." To him entities are reals and not mere unrealities. The world is really a universe. "It is organically one, it is complete, everything real (divine or human etc.) is it, or within it; and it is rational or orderly." ¹ The substance, Spinozistically conceived is either, a systematic organic universe, well-ordered, divinely governed, of whose many-sided attributes we know only two, viz. extension or material energy, and thought or mind-energy; or else it is a mere static being, a pseudo-universal, because non-concrete, undetermined and unknowable. In the former case, the substance or God is the mystical conception passionately achieved and exemplified a real concrete universal principle which is so integrally related to Nature and beings (the typification of material and mind-energies?), and in the latter, a barren entity that is ballasted from all actuality, as such an abstraction. But yet the philosophic concept of concrete substance, a unity at once real and universal, will not be achieved so long as the relation of substance to its attributes is not established. The tendency to monism is a real logical requirement of thought and the logical need and the psychological and religious groping at a concrete unitary concept of substance has converted a theoretical need into a metaphysical indispensability. What then is the Substance that will satisfy us?

There are three entities of which we have real knowledge.

A. Our own existence of which we are directly aware and intuitively certain; a proposition which all intuitionists justify. Not only that, while the laws of our thought persist, they compel us to admit that *operari sequitur esse*. It is the principle on which the possibility of consciousness and unity of knowledge depends.

It is the soul which forms the fleeting series of impressions, thoughts into a continuous system of experience, thus making a continuous and connected consciousness possible. The Buddhistic denial of such an *operari sequitur esse*, and their affirmation of the fleeting states as constituting the false idea of a self, is a self-contradictory statement, for how can memory, recognition and recollection take place without an identical focus and self for which there is memory, recognition and recollection? (Sri-Bhashya-I. i. 1.) Further it is the one self-evident fact that we cannot get rid of by any amount of doubting as Des Cartes quite realised, and the Vedantic assertion of the reality of the Ego (aham) or Atman is founded on this impossibility of getting rid of the self-evident '*Selfness*'.

B. The existence of God of which we are self-evidently certain if not intuitively, conceive it as we may, either in the Cartesian way as more intuitively certain than ourselves or even as Kant held that it might be legitimate as a 'regulative idea,' which we can no more disprove than we can prove, or else even as a logical requirement of thought as the ultimate ground or Substance.

C. The knowledge of the world or material things and objects through sensation which if they have not the certainty ourselves and God possess, is yet *practically* certain. It is on account of this category that all philosophy is divided into two primary groups of materialism and mentalism or else Monism and Pluralism of either type of Materialism or Idealism. Matter as the third entity can never be got rid of by any amount of intellectual subterfuge. It demands that it must be counted as an ultimate category. A real monism that is at once concrete, real and universal must be achieved between these three entities of which the second viz, God or the ultimate Substance should hold the first and the third in an intimate unity within itself suffusing each one of them with his presence. Our Conception of God must rule out every trend of Deism and affirm a substance that is the ground of all existence. Our God must be an immanent presence, rather than a far-off transcendence. The distinct and

seemingly opposite categories of matter, which forms the world of Nature distinguishing itself as the mental and physical nature of individual selves, and Spiritual entities, finite in themselves, which operate in nature and for whom, in a sense this world exists, must seek an intimate relation in the way of modes or attributes of God, the ultimate religious moral and philosophic Being and Ideal. These three entities¹ may be expressed to be the Enjoyer, the enjoyed (the World) and the Ultimate inspirer, (Bhoktha, bhogyam Prerithárancha matva).

The ultimate substance being thus intellectually conceived, the nature of Being as conceived by Sankara shall be first considered, as it features such a large part in the tirade of Ramanuja against false interpretations of the Vedanta-sutras, and also as it is for us philosophically important, standing as it does for a very pure Monism.

For Advaita, the ultimate substance is consciousness, which alone is Truth, Intelligence and Eternal and One only, सत्य ज्ञान अनन्तम् ब्रह्म which all mean the same thing. This Brahman is mere experience or Anubhuti, or Samvid. The primal substance is neither the individual nor the objects of cognition, but an all-embracing consciousness, which is never absent, for of its absence we can predicate nothing, nor of its non-existence can we speak with any sense of intelligibility, as it is consciousness alone that must make such a Judgement, which it cannot do if it was not. Samvid is thus One all-embracing consciousness which is the same throughout, whatever be its content, either illusions or objects or dreams or real knowledge itself. It is permanent, for by no means can it be held that it was not. Consciousness being thus impossible of disproof and since it is self-luminous (svayamprakāśa) we can never prove its non-existence (abhāva) which would involve self-contradiction. Anubhuti does not need a perceiver of the same because it could bend itself to survey itself. Further to be an object of cognition is to be a material entity (achetana). But if it is not an object, is it a subject? No; it is neither

1. The resemblance to Locke is surely marked here.

subject nor object but a passive spectator. Indeed, we may say, that it is that absolute consciousness or experience where subject and object have no meaning; it is unrelationed and all relations between subject and object are unreal, and do not pertain to the ultimate substance. The objective world which manifests difference and relations between subjects and objects and between things and things, is generated by avidya (ignorance) as such not only things but subjects, who are intelligent selves are all unreal having been due to an eternal avidya and māya. Consciousness is unoriginated as we have already seen it to be the permanent behind the fluctuating differences and changes and as being never absent. Difference or multiplicity, and qualities which define in a way plurality and relations, it has none, because differences and qualities are due to an overlaying of Avidya on Brahman and also such a statement of relations pertaining to Brahman leads to infinite regress. The Sastras or Sabda speak only of an undifferenced Brahman (niravayava). What exists is pure Being, attributeless undifferenced consciousness. Sri Sankara's view is that in the initial perception of a thing, a perception which is not adulterated by practical thought, or by thought which imposes its own ideas (samskārarūpa upādhis) on the thing sensed, is a presentation absolutely undifferenced; it is a mere 'that'. This quiescent back ground in the presentation continuum, which later in Savikalpaka prathyaksha, attains practical life and movement, is a mere 'that'. It is the unchanging unqualified, indeterminate and passive Witness. This consciousness on which background—(as we cannot in any of our experience get rid of consciousness and cannot prove its absence) is illuminated the fleeting perceptions, is the ultimate Substance. The realm of the objective is a huge categorial make-up. Thus to Sankara, it would mean that the empirically 'real, which we shall call the Actual, is unreal and the real is never the actual; in the sense of only *ideally* present is it actual in any sense. In which case, Truth or सत्य is ideal and real, the actual is unreal because it is actual. The close western parallel which Parmenides is, is further accentuated in latter times of the modern day in Immanuel Kant in whose philosophy we find the phenomenon-noumenon relation

is mysterious but all the same present. Between Phenomenon and nuomenon we can never point how one is originated from another, and as Kant himself confessed, regarding the causal relation we cannot affirm anything between reality and the whole realm or totality of Phenomena. Sankara, however, does not leave it at that. For him, it is due to an eternal agnānam (darkness) overlaying itself on the shining and self-luminous background Brahman, which is the passive intelligent spectator of the whole thing, the various apparent manifold creation of objects and things and egos arise¹. The clouding or overlaying is due to Māya, a mysterious power, not describable as real or as unreal. The real is thus a single experience which is not 'involved' in the unreal manifold, yet 'really' appearing as manifold. That Absolute Experience, which is known only by those who give up this multiplicity, is best described as true (satyam), meaning by that not-false, Gnānam because it is not ignorance and matter, Anantam (eternal) meaning by that not-perishing and timeless. All positive predication it refutes, because every qualification means reduction of quality, and reduction of it to the level of the definite and the differenced. This unknowable, however speciously concealed under the name of the attainable, transcends all limiting categories of Thought; but does not such a being thus standing undefined, equally give itself to non-being because we never come across such an entity and cannot speak about it? Does not such an attitude perilously descend to Sunya-vāda against which Sri Sankara so ably lifted his banner of revolt?

Therefore this conception of substance of Advāita, Ramānuja refutes categorically in his *Maha Siddhanta of Sri Bhashya*. The theory of Consciousness as Substance is a very faulty conception, firstly, because the subject of experience is not consciousness but a *conscious subject*—a subject who possesses consciousness as an instrument of functioning in the act of cognizing or knowing.

Secondly, consciousness is not that which subsists in all states (avasthas), for consciousness is an activity of the knower

1. cf, Chapter II,

or subject and is set in action only when the subject requires it, i. e. when the subject engages itself with an object or reacts to stimuli.

Thirdly, Consciousness is not eternal, because consciousness, as stated in the previous objection, is an interim activity and by no means absolutely required throughout existence. (Of course the modern psychologists hold consciousness to be a stream, but it no more explains the specific function of consciousness as a cognitive act always). It is only when he *functions*, consciousness is present. "As this quality is not however essential but originated by action, the self is essentially unchanging" (I. 1. 1 pp 63). And consciousness itself is evidence of its nonpresence (abháva), as when we speak 'I *am* conscious', 'I *was* awake' or 'I *was* asleep'. Further consciousness is a knowledge-activity of the Subject and makes the object present to its subject. Consciousness is active only in the compresence of subject and object and is not manifest otherwise, though by no means absent as a potential function or quality of the subject. The quality of being a knowing-subject (not of being conscious) is not absolutely essential (taccha na svabhāvika) to the individual ego (jīva); it is that, whenever it engages itself with an object, as such whenever this kshétrajña-condition i. e. of being a knower, takes place, consciousness manifests itself as a projection of action, just as the shining rays of light or brilliance proceeds from lamps, Sun, and gems. दीपस्त्वयंप्रकाशस्वभावस्त्वयमे प्रकाशते.

In its passivity, there is no particular action not even of cognition, no engagement with any particular object or objects ; it is a dull awareness. So much so, this dull awareness of the non-cognitive period in the action of cognizing (whose sphere is unlimited *per se*) due to this particular engagement with a particular object, becomes focussed and fused with its immediate presentation or sensum. Or in other words, "owing to this influence of Karman (work) it becomes of a contracted nature as it more or less adopts itself to work of different kinds and is variously determined by different senses." (I. i. 1.) क्षेत्रज्ञावस्थायां कर्मणा संकुचितस्वरूपं तत्तत्कर्मानुगुणतरतमभावेन वर्तते । तत्रे निश्चयादेण व्यवस्थितम् । तमिममिन्द्रियद्वारा ज्ञानप्रसारमेषद्वयोदयास्तमयव्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते ।

But the subject as knower, must be an intelligent entity, as consciousness is possible only to an intelligence (chêtana). In other words, Consciousness as an attribute or quality of a conscious subject, is quite different from the subject whose nature is consciousness or intelligence. एवमात्माचिद्रूपएव चैतन्यगुण इति । चिद्रूपता हि स्वयंप्रकृता.

Because intelligence is seen in every presence of consciousness, the latter being the quality of the intelligent subject, it is false to assert that consciousness is the substance and that intelligence is its nature. Nor could it be said that because of the sameness of consciousness in every individual, the individuals are foci somehow concreted by matter (ahamkāra ?). The sphere of knowing of a conscient subject when not limited or contracted by saṃskāras or actions, is the whole of reality. But as we are, we are so determined and the possibility of that total experience is attained only when we leave the centralised point and achieve or rather fulfil the world-actions with the consciousness of the perfect. The unbiased decentralised or acentric vision does not distort reality and its meaning like a lens not corrected for spherical and chromatic aberration, thus projecting distorted and coloured but gives the perfect vision or representation of the whole.

Further, fourthly, that the eternal stretch of consciousness (anubhūti) should be capable of being deflected by different ignorants (avidyas) to give rise to the individual existences and egos is inconceivable. For consciousness, conceding to it an eternal stretch of same intensity over every object, would appear to be defined objects of various types just as the spectral colours, when thrown upon similar objects or identical things, reveal multi-coloured and different things with various names, but it certainly could not account for the persistence of the egos though it would give rise to the particularisations of tensions and tones. It would, in the best interpretation, reveal fleeting existences rather than permanent objects. The reason given by Advaita for the inference of different infinite ignorants (avidyas) whose very existence is dependent upon the presence of the egos, an inference drawn by their presence, and also that their (egos) presence as the resultant

synthesising, we would be thrown upon an absolute, absolutely unknowable, an entity which would be neither spirit nor matter, neither subject nor object, non-subject and non-object, not Being and not Not-Being. What it is, can never be said or thought. But such an unknowable, despite what its supporters may claim for it, as the culmination of thought and feeling in a grand Mystical Being, is atleast not tenable as a logically comprehensible substance,

Spirit and matter, subject and object are no opposites but distincts and the further term involved in the one case, would be Activity; and consciousness, in the other; activity, when spirit rules, controls, and sustains matter and fashions it to its ends; consciousness, when the subject is in compresence with its objects or object.¹ It is not true to assert that to be an object of consciousness or rather a conscious subject is to be unintelligent *per se*.² For the intimate capacity of a subject is to be conscious of itself, in which case, it would be itself unintelligent according to such a dictum, which certainly is absurd. Ramanuja says that you should not define that as 'being of the nature

1, "Every fact of consciousness is made up of atleast three moments; every such fact depends for its existence upon the presence of an ego, of a content of consciousness, of a relation between these two, Every fact in reality with which I am acquainted is not merely a fact, it is also owing to relation of 'having in consciousness', a content of consciousness in other words, the Ego exercises towards it the *function* of becoming conscious". N. Lossky's article in the *Ency. of Phil. Sciences* on the "*Transformation of the concept of consciousness in Modern epistemology and its bearing on Logic*."

2. Sri Bhāshya, I. i. 1. (61pp. trans).

(a) We do not apprehend other centres or selves as unconcious.

(b) "Mere being i. e. Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the instruments of Knowledge, and thus there would cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself (Sankara) non-intelligence, perishableness and so on". I. i. 1.

(c) The general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object is, in fact, untenable.

that light is present without exception'. It is true that the conscious self which stands in the particular determinate relation of object to another conscious self, may be passive to its subject at *that* moment, but it cannot even be legitimately claimed, that that other self is not treating the knowing-consciousness as *its* object at that moment. Thus whatever stands in an *objective relation* is an object and that need not be necessarily non-intelligent *per se*, and that it is intelligent in at least one case, will be showed presently.

The inability to deny objective relations to the Spirit or intelligence must force us to assume a different postulate. The relation of Subject-object, and spirit-matter, anyhow subsists and ought to subsist even with regard to the ultimate Being as far as logic goes. To deny this, were to accept in some way or other the defeat of thought in its pursuit to know truth. Out of this impasse can we not seek a path out, if we assert that though there is difference of nature between matter and spirit, object and subject, they are held in unity by one of the terms? And further, is it not quite apparent that once we grant that, the superior in nature or character between them must naturally therefore be called the sustainer in the relation? The object is not object until and unless it is sustained and enjoyed by its subject. The functional importance of the subject (which is *intelligence always*) in the relation ought to be recognized, as much as the functional importance of the superiority of intelligence or spirit over matter. They cannot destroy each other, but they are bound to unity and this unity is achieved by the superior between them assuming control and direction over the lower, using it for purposes which it alone knows. Matter has no ends for itself and can have no ends as it is unintelligent; it is fashioned towards ends by the spirit which holds it captive and pervades it as its self¹.

1. Sri Bhāṣya I. 1. 1. (pp 92) "The world is *HE*". The identity expressed by this clause is founded on the fact that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the world as its self in the character of inward ruler; and is *not founded* on the *unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world pervaded.*" तदात्म्यमन्तर्यामिरूपेणऽत्मतया व्याप्तिकृतम्; ननु व्याप्यव्यापकाय स्वेक्यकृतम्.

In knowledge-relation, the subject because of the character of knowing, is superior to its object and the object as the object of the knower, is sustained by the relation and made *one* with its subject, a unity or relation at once integral; and consciousness is the incident activity which is the expression of the nature of intelligence it is.

The three entities (by *entity* meaning whatever can be thought about, as Dr. Whitehead remarks) are involved in knowing, namely, the knowing subject, the known object, and the act or function of becoming conscious, which function brings about the relation of unity between the two terms. To stress the knowing act or function, because it appears to be the back-ground on which the subject and object seem to be differenced, more than the knower and the known, as if these are the secondary inflexions of it and within it, were to assume too much from the data we have in actuality, indeed, it seems to be a perversion of this fact.

In the first place, Brahman is the ultimate inner self, *antaryāmi*) of 'all beings,' holding both nature and finite selves in an absolutely dependent relation or rather effect-relation (cf. 1st. chapter). As the ultimate inner self, Brahman is the ultimate knower of everything, because he is the ultimate intelligence pervading everything, act and function, destining them to the ultimate goal of perfection, unexhausted by any, being over and above each and every existence, He is the transcendent and immanent ground of their being what they are. He is the concrete universal, the real Absolute. He is the ultimate subject or knower, which does not mean the unqualified non-personal *sākshi chaitanyam*, but an infinitely intelligent *personality*.

The secondary subject is the individual subject, the finite knower; and it is only when the knowledge of the ultimate substance (Brahman) and that of the individual knower agree and are not variant, the individual's knowledge is perfect and whole with regard to an object. If however, the individual knowledge is different from that of Brahman (a fact of comparison that in

the very nature of things, perhaps, impossible) which however, is very easily seen in its practical ineffectuality in and for life, the individual knowing is vitiated by egoistic and pragmatic considerations and becomes erroneous. The effort to which the finite selves are bound to by the dissatisfaction which the present knowledge gives them, is enough to show that their knowledge is wanting in that self-appreciation or self-evidence characteristic of reality's own appreciation. In fact, reality seeks this characteristic achievement through the finite selves or centres moving towards the divine consummation of perfection which is the potential characteristic of itself and the *actual* character of the Deity.

Between the primary Kshètragna and the secondary subject, the monad to use the expression of Leibniz, the relation is interesting. Here the objective would be the secondary subject in so far as it is being held in relation *as an object* by the supreme subject on whom it is dependent for very power, by whom it is enjoyed, directed and perfected. By being thus held the individual subject does not become a material entity ; on the other hand, at the same time he perhaps holds as *his* object both nature and God himself. But does not this mean, it may be suggested, that God would lose his dominancy and would be a dependent entity on what is essentially a finite entity even according to definition ? No ; for in so far as there is relation shown between two entities, whilst it no doubt reveals dependence of each upon the other, it does not point to any imperilling of nature of the superior amongst them. As already hinted at, that whatever stands in an objective-relation need not be achétana (unintelligent) even at that moment, for in the case of two spiritual subjects, it may happen that each is holding the other as an objective, but that does not show any dependence except of relatedness. But in this relation between a finite subject and God as object, the *superior in the relation is undoubtedly the object* and not the subject, as such the object *controls* the subject. It is the ideal which standing in the objective-relation transforms and spiritualises the subject whilst holding him all-through in relation as the primary subject He is.

In fact in some cases it is patent, that it is matter that holds the subject captive, in which case agnána (delusion) is the result. God as the supreme person and as the supreme subject is dominating the monad always. This would clearly reveal that the finite monad (jiva) is organic to God, as much as God is organic to the Jiva or man. In his relation to nature, or the Universe, it is with the power of knowing and the capacity of dominating in however little measure, the Jiva holds the partial phases of nature in subjection, in so far and in so far only and in such relative degrees as God wills it or according as his perfected evolution permits; in either case, it is measured by the greater expressive presence of the Ideal or the ideal Person who rules him by its or his-interiority and superiority over the Jiva.

Nature or Matter is *mere* object, absolutely subject to Brahman. The objectivity of the selves and nature towards God, the ultimate subject is an assertion of their reality. For, *to be objective is to be real, as much as, to be subjective is to be self-evident*. As such in this mutual relatedness of function as well as in substance, objective and subjective, and of the greater evidency of the subjective which controls its objective, the subjective can be, not illegitimately, claimed to be the core of the relation. The subject integrally related with its object is the real truth. The individual sentient self is organic to nature and to God, and nature and God are equally organic to the individual self. So also between Nature or matter and God, there is an inseparable (aprathiksiddha) relation. Brahman is the eternal subject, Sákshi, which means not the pure objectless impersonal consciousness of Advaita, but the knower, the subject. "By a witness (sákshin) we understand some one who knows about something by a personal observation (sákshát); a person who does not know cannot be a witness". Accordingly, says Ramanuja, 'a knowing subject only, not mere knowledge (consciousness) is spoken of as witness'. साक्षित्वं च साक्षाज्ज्ञातृत्वमेव and Pánini Says साक्षाद्द्रष्टरि संज्ञायाम्-

When the substance is thus conceived to be the subject as qualified by its object, the conception of the object translates itself to one of a mode in relation to the substance.

All philosophy aims at a definite and synthetic and synoptic conception of reality. And if the qualified or rather defined, it is what it means, Being were declared as a false representation of what is essentially undefinable and if it be suggested that even definition is an outrage against its perfection, then, for the reasons already put forward, we have to search as to where the fallacy in that objection lies. The classical dictum of Spinoza that 'all determination is negation' is perfectly true, because to define certain characters to an object or thing, were to negate their opposites and other characters or qualities to the thing. The proposition is self-evident. But does negation of those other qualities mean lessening of perfection of the thing? Truth negates false, but can we in any sense expect that to negate the false were to lessen the perfection of thing which we define as true? Perfection can only mean maximum of positive qualities and never negative qualities as well, for negative qualities are not qualities but mere abstractions of the positive, concrete in no sense. Sankara would not allow any definite character to the Absolute except in negative terms to denote, perhaps, its positivity, which he recognizes it to possess, but would not at any rate, allow positive predications of which we know and infer from the nature of the world, even in its accentuated quality. But we know of no mind except a human mind at least in its basal quality, for as was said elsewhere, a divine vision must yet be a vision, a divine audition must yet be an audition. Sankara maintains the Absolute to be a conscious Sákshi, but would not allow it to be a subject; it is the ground of all experience of subjects and objects, but it is not at all 'involved' in its operation; it is not personal; it is pure, having no object and no relation. Spinoza's dictum combined with its false rider, which is not always true, yields a qualityless substratum, a mere Being, of which no one can tell anything, 'into which all are dissolved and in which none can exist', because to touch its fringes were to lose identity and individuality: but individuality is false and is due to Máya, a mysterious power; but identity? with *what* shall it be identical?

But there is no substance apart from its attributes or relations or qualities. There is nothing of the nature of self-contradiction either in the nature of modes or relations or qualities to make us assume the impossible postulate that this world is inverted truth or essentially false or even unknowable in constitution.

The substance without its attributes and qualities, the *dharmi* without *dharma*, a *guni* without *guṇas*, are distorted representations.¹ The fact is that they are distinguishable but not separable. The nature of substance though definitely distinct from that of the attributes or modes is yet distinct from that of the attributes. The Synthetic Unity (is it *a priori*?) between them, namely, substance-attribute, subject-object, spirit-matter, is the initial reality and not a resultant of the synthesising mind; it is the reality that we recognize, yet disjunct and accentuate whilst distinguishing.

Here it is useful to distinguish between modes and qualities as it would help us to arrive at the view of Ramanuja more exactly as to the relation obtaining between the Substance and its modes, and also as to the nature of the Substance itself.

1. A *Mode* or attribute is that by which we come to know the Substance. I prefer to use the word 'mode' as against Spinoza's use of the word attribute, as a 'mode' is any dependent existence of that on which it is dependent; whereas the attribute which Spinoza defines—a definition at once vague though useful—'is that which understanding perceives as constituting the essence of substance.' Taking this to mean nothing other than a realistic definition (Kuno Fischer gives a Kantian colour), whatever mode or attribute (giving the logical general-concept of the modes, for the attribute subsumes all finite facts or modes under the two primary abstract concepts of Thought and Extension) leads us to

1. cf. *Vaiseshika* and *Bhāskara* also hold that qualities cannot be conceived apart from its substance; *Dharma dharmi abhedāt*. cf. "A substance although it is nothing apart from its qualities, must not therefore be 'distinct' from its attributes." In fact, a substance is not to be identified with 'any or all of those qualities' which constitute the nature of substance nor with the 'aggregate of its qualities or any system formed of them'; cf. *Nature of Existence*: Mc Taggart. Bk II. ch. V.

interpret or infer the character of the ultimate Being of which it is a function or dependent existence or expression, would lead us to speak of it as *its* attribute or mode (*prakāra*). Thought and extension or energy, as Spinoza would call these two secondary ultimates, or *Prakṛiti* and individual *Jīvas* as Ramanuja would call these two substantial entities, alone reveal to us the nature of Reality, though we must be careful to add that these two entities in turn seek existence and accomplishment, only in the ultimate existence or Substance or Spirit.

This Highest concrete entity unlike the Spinozistic substance, is the Brahman and no generic character. The ontological search through their functionings leads us to the concept of their cause or ground which is a unitary substance and is both actual and real, as also ideal and perfect, to which all creation moves as its end. Ramanuja holds that these modes form an eternal dependent relation as *prakāra* of Brahman, whom Brahman in turn animates as their self. Thus whenever we speak of matter and its energy or activity or evolution ¹, we are in reality speaking of the self or spirit, who directs its evolutions in such lines as to yield the greatest benefit or greatest expression. Whenever we speak of the individual finite selves and their activities and realisations, we are at the same time implicitly expressing a knowledge about God who sustains them and directs them, helping them to the ideal or perfection.² The energies of men and of matter are all sustained by their relation to Brahman. These two entities standing in this inevitable and inseparable (*aprathikṣiddha*) relation to Being or Brahman who is the ultimate spirit, form as such, his modes or expressions of Power, and they in turn, find their realisation ³ in Brahman and no where else.

1- Sri Bhāshya : I. i 6 ; I. 1. 23, 24, 25, & 26.

2. Sri Bhāshya : I. i 31 ; I. iv. 22. & II. iii 41. "action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest" cf. Keno Up 3. 1. 11. & 4. 1

3. Sri Bhāshya : "When a thing is apprehended under the form "this is such and such", the element apprehended as 'such' is what constitutes a *mode* ; now as this element is relative to the thing, and finds *accomplishment in the thing only* ; hence the word also, which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the thing". (pp227)

In so far as these two entities form inseparable relations and eternal relations, for we can never dissolve matter or jivas (minds) however much we may spiritualise or etherise or exalt matter into nullity, for even then they must stand in that objective-relation forming the ground of material phenomena or sensation-continuum ; nor the individual selves or monads, however much we may diffuse them or exalt them into mere thrills on the ocean-lap of spiritual existence of Being, or channels or foci of the vast powerful flood of God's Sakti we cannot deprive them of their specific individuality even in their highest identity in functioning, which of the fact that they can never be disjuncted or dissolved into a single source, must by that fact form a unitary existential relation, integral and organic, with Brahman. Brahman thus becomes the only one without a second ruler and self ; which only means that these modes are not modes of any other entity,¹ as there cannot be one such. What exists in this single (Ēkam) intelligent eternal ruling principle, sustaining as an immanent principle through his bliss (ānandatva) the world of nature and jivas; through them he reveals his blissful blessed qualities of love, knowledge etc. (Kalyāṇaguṇah)

An attribute or mode constitutes whatever stands in an integral inseparable absolute eternal dependent relationship with its substance. Thus a dharma or whatever stands in this relation and is sustained by another entity would be called its mode. Consciousness would as such, be also called a dharma of its substrate or the intelligence of which it is a function, for "it is that which stands forth or manifests itself through its own being to its object its own being"² or it is a *function*³ of the ego.

अनुभूतिस्त्वं नाम वर्तमानदशायां स्वसत्तवे स्वाश्रयंप्रति प्रकाश-
मानत्वम् स्वसत्तैव स्वविषयसाधनत्ववां.

As such it is known technically to distinguish it from its

1. Śrī-Bhāshya I. i 1.

2. Śrī-Bhāshya I. i 1.

3. N. Lossky. *Enc. Phil. Sciences*.

substrate which is also called *gnānasvarupa*, "*dharmabhuta-gnanam*." Nature or matter is a function of the absolute intelligence of the unitary relation immanent between them. The Dharma or Dharm₁ is distinguished by the superiority or inferiority, imperfection or perfection, of that between which dependence is to be shown. The superior or the more *vital* in the relation being called the *Dharm₁*, and the lesser as the *Dharma* of the former. I identify for convenience, Dharma with a mode, an entity, and not a quality (*guṇa*), which stands as an absolutely dependent existence forming an integral relation with that on which it depends. It follows thus, that the worlds are predicates of the Being.¹

2. Quality : ²

A substance may be conceived to be different from its absolute relations or modes, (though it is essentially an intellectual effort and it is this distinction that is the cause of our ignorant activities) even then, we can sketch its nature, *svarupa*, as distinct from its modes. Whilst some things stand in an inseparable relation to a particular thing, as such constituting what are called its modes, it may possess individual qualities expressive of its perfections. Brahman as the ideally perfect, as the absolute Spirit is all intelligent, great and powerful, merciful (*dayāmaya*), omniscient and omnipotent etc., ³ which qualities (*gunas*) cannot be deprived from their substance; shall we say, that just as when all the qualities of redness, volume, weight, and every sensory

1. God is called *sarvādhār*, यथोदकं दुर्गवृष्टं पर्वतेषु विधावति ।

एवं धर्माश्च पृथक् पश्यंस्तानेवाहुविधावति ॥ Kato up II. 1.14.

2. cf. *Sri Bhāshya*, I. i 13. where it is maintained that quality is not mere quality but always in co-ordination with its substance. A reference may be made to McTaggart's chapter on Quality in his *Nature of Existence*, where he analyses the whole subject. It is in my opinion the nearest approach to Ramanuja's view. But this chapter was written prior to any reference to that book.

3. cf. *Yatindramatadipikā* pp 83. सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तित्वाद्यः सृष्ट्युपपत्ताधर्मो :: वास्तव्य सौशील्यमौलभ्यादय आश्रयणोपयुक्तधर्मः ; कारुण्यादयो रक्षणोपयुक्ता धर्मः.

In Ramanuja's system, Isvara or Brahman is He who possesses not only these powers, indeed those powers are a consequence of his being the Self of the Prakṛiti and the Purushas and they his body (*sarirabhuta*).

Sri Bhāshya, I. i 1,

predication is removed there is nothing left, so also, these qualities make it the being it is. It is these *guṇas* that constitute its adjectives and perfections. Substance is not a mere 'that' or an undetermined 'somewhat', to which the qualities, the 'whats', are added afterwards. These *guṇas* characterise it as the highest superior and lord over its modes. Nothing exists except as qualitatively determined; existence and nature are in the strictest sense inseparable (*aprathiksiddha*) and its existence as such is determined by the systematic unity of its qualities, expressed through its functions. Qualities represent the order and kind of existence of the existents. But it is also true that the relations determine the quality of the whole.

A further distinction between a quality and an attribute or a mode (*dharma*) is that a *dharma* is an *entity*, which can, in a certain measure, be realised apart from its *dharmi*, as its extension or function, just as the rays of light may be perceived as apart from its source, though we certainly infer it to have a source or ground. It is an entity (*dravya*, sometimes translated as substance, meaning, having substantiveness) a function that may be perceived or realised even when we do not see the substance of which it is a function. Thus it is not absolutely necessary *in practice*, as the sceptics and atheists claim, to inquire about God whenever we perceive Nature or individual *jīvas*. But a quality as quality cannot be seen elsewhere than *in* its subject of which it is a quality or *guṇa*. The object cannot be except *with* its qualities and qualities cannot be seen except *in* their substance. Consciousness, as a function of the Ego, and as an extension of the ego, stands in a unique relation to the Ego, seen only during the activity of the Ego. The worlds likewise, are not seen except in the *pravṛtti-kāla* of Brahman. But the character of the Subject as an Intelligence, is seen nowhere else except *in* the subject himself, though that intelligent quality is attributed only as a result of conscious function, as such constitutes the *nirupita-svarūpa-guṇa* or *viśeṣha* of the subject. God is conceived to be omnipotent and omniscient because those are inferred to be his nature as seen in his 'functions' or modes. The

quality of a 'mode', we can speak of, just as when we say, that matter is unintelligent or that nature is blind, or that it is the existing ground of material things or perceptions, and the absolutely dependent and the eternal objective that never knows to be a subject. But the quality of a *guṇa* we cannot define except as a perceived exemplification in the things and it cannot be abstractly defined. It cannot be treated as a relation as that would lead to endless regress as Bradley full well showed. Redness is redness and is a simple sensation of a specific wave-length of light; it cannot be described in any other simpler way. We can only reiterate that quality as *its* quality. A relation is 'between' something¹; a quality 'in' and 'of' something. We can technically call the mode as the *Svarupa-nirupaka-dharma*, and the quality as the *nirupita-svarupa-guna* or *viśeshana*.²

Having made this distinction between a *dharma* and a *guṇa*, (it is however unfortunate that neither Ramanuja nor his commentators have given specific terms for differentiating between these two, which they certainly do and must distinguish from one another), a qualityless substance is a nullity; an attributeless or mode-less substance or existence an incomprehensibility. These relations are absolute as there can be no separation of these to form any others. The Absolute Brahman thus, by being the sustainer (*dhārayitum*) of the modes, reveals himself as having these relations within himself. Variable relations, however, subsist between the individual intelligences among themselves and in their relations with partial phases of Nature. Thus the so-called external relations subsist and obtain in the case of

1. I use between *something* and not *between* "things", because whilst a relation is truly between two or more things, yet it sometimes happens in introspection that it is "between" itself, that is what is meant by *Prathyaktva*. A relation can never be reduced to a quality, a "between" into one of "in" or "of". It can equally never happen that a quality can be reduced to one of relation. A mode is that which stands in a relation; it is a substance standing in a asymetrical dependent relation with another substance; a relation of a "substance to its quality is asymetrical since a substance cannot inhere in a quality."

2. I have no authority for calling them so; on the other hand, the view maintained by some others seems to be different. Anyway I had a justification as in the case of *Dharma-bhuta-guṇa*. Hence this.

individual selves within their own commune, and in their relations with things of the universe. It would be meaningless to hold that external relations obtain between the Absolute and its modes, as if the modes are not sustained by the Spirit that bathes them. *Absolute relations that are impossible of sundering or varying are internal*, because immanently ground in their very nature, as such, are eternal relations within the bosom of reality; *the variable relations are external relations, between the reals*. Brahman does not rest upon external relations, for it would mean that there can be a bare being without qualities and modes, or else it would mean that it is dependent upon something other than itself for very being. And both these explanations are absurd. On the other hand, dependence is for the individual selves or jivas and for prakriti, which have external relations as between themselves.

Relations *per se* do not reveal any dependence except in this way that to be dependent is not to forsake. In philosophy, the tendency of every idealistic method has been and is always to show dependence upon the Subject and Spirit and to stress the independence of Spirit and subject. But such a dependence and independence is only relatively distinguished by the superiority of that between which these terms are used, and is merely puerile when this independence is condemned to an absolute subsumption or as unnecessary to that on which it is dependent or to which it is related. Every phase and effort of the subject produces only such phases and reactions on its objects, as such, the subject might legitimately be called the absolute destiner of its objects. But to be an absolute destiner or even a destiner is not the same thing as to be absolutely independent of that which is destined. Independence does not mean unrelatedness nor does perfection mean non-qualifiedness or non-determination. The independence of spirit or ultimate being or God, consists in its supreme power of destining, in its exaltation and in its perfection, over and above the dependents, in a word, because of its infinite transcendence whilst it works or exhibits itself through them as an immanent goal. The Ideal that works

through the individual finites imperfect as they are, does not get lowered by such a working; it only shows its own virility and superiority over every obstacle which are not to it obstacles, or rather only apparent and seeming obstacles if at all.

The establishing of the intrinsic relation between modes and the substance, in other words, the assertion of reality to individual selves and the sensuous nature and their unitary relation to Brahman or the ultimate substance, is the establishing of the *reality* of the substance itself. Neither bare singularity of Advaita, for identity can obtain only between two *real* (and be it noted, not unreal) entities, nor even the absolute plurality which Dvaita owns, could be real, till a real synthesis at once logical and true to experience between unity and multiplicity is achieved. And this is achieved by Ramanuja through this conception of unity which organically holds the multiplicity within itself and gives it the character of truth. Whilst reducing the relation to one of modal relation, just like Spinoza, there is here no abstract general concept which the Being of Spinoza certainly is, which makes it impossible for him to guarantee the modes any individual existence, not even could he derive those modes once he has refunded them into their source or ground (for out of the abstract how could the concrete issue at all? a fact that Spinoza quite realised)—Ramanuja does not dissolve them into the abstract Universal, but whilst keeping them real, subsumes them as modes or real functions which never are dissolved but are only kept back from functioning during the periods of Pralaya, in the same way as consciousness is suspended but not extinguished as a function of the intelligent subject, as it is the characteristic expression, attribute and function of the Intelligent subject he is. We cannot at any moment except under delusion or illusion, disjunct the relation between these triune entities so egregiously as to call them disparate or unconnected entities. The possibility of delusion arises only in the case of less perfect entities viz. individual monads, from the non-perception of these absolute relations and the upward thrusts of Spiritual life, and from the non-perception of their real dependence upon the ultimate unity of power, life and

truth which is Brahman. This possibility of accordance with separate activities or individualised activities which Brahman seeks fulfilment in and though particular Jivas blurs the sense of the whole and the One, which is *natural* to them, in such wise as to induce in them an atrophy of real thought, in such relative degrees as is necessary for the consummation of the ideal or goal which God wills and to which creation moves, and accelerates in them an activity of crystalised and centralised egoism (ahamkāra and mamakāra).

The Nature of the Modes.

The Jivas: There are infinite eternal spiritual or monadic entities. These are eternal, Ramanuja says, not in the sense that "all has itself in that" or "all this indeed is Brahman in which case, that general enunciation would mean that even ether and created elements would have to be conceived as eternal," (II. iii. 18.) but in quite a different sense that its character changes not, but merely "passes over into a different condition", from inactivity of deep sleep to the activity of lila-period. Thus though an effect, the individual self or jiva is unproduced. "The intelligent one is not born nor does it die."

2. The soul's essential nature is spiritual, that is, it is a knowing-subject. It is essentially a knower (I. i. 13.). "Different from this self consisting of understanding (Vignāna), there is the inner self consisting of Bliss...The soul in the states of bondage and release alike is a knowing subject." It is 'not mere intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold' nor 'is the soul, as Kanada thinks, essentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, which intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it'. (II. iii) "He is a person whose self is knowledge." But because it is a knowing subject, it does not mean that it is omnipresent. For it 'passes out' and 'returns' as such infinitesimal, a monad.² (II. iii. 20.)

1. "By that light this self departs either through the eye, or through the skull, or other parts of the body" . . . "all those who pass away out of the world go to the moon" and "return from that world to the world of action." Brihad up. 4. 4. 2.

2. *Introduction to Pancharatra*. O. Schrader, pp. 57.

स्वरूपं अशुभात्म्यं स्यात् ज्ञानानन्दैकलक्षणम्

नसरेष्टप्रमाणान् ते रश्मिकोटिविभूतितः.

It is the Brahman that is called the infinite and "great not the individual". "The individual self is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of hair divided a hundred times and yet it is to be infinite". And how it could be infinite is explained in the next sutra by saying that its knowledge is infinitely extendable or pervasive, comparing such a feature to the scent (gandha) of sandal ointment which spreads all over the body refreshing it when it is applied to a particular portion of the body alone, (II. iii. 24.) or just like a source of light spreading its light all through out space. (II. iii. 26.) "By such a residence of the soul in the heart of the physical body (is it the sukshma body ?) with the help of the examples of sandal-paste and flames which extend their scent and light though resident in a particular portion of space, through their qualities of scent and light throughout the body and space, (II. iii. 25 & 26.) proves the capacity of a real nature of the soul to shine, and to know reality in full through its essential quality of consciousness (dharmabhūtagāna) and to control and sustain its body.

3. The designation of knowledge as self, e.g. "He is the person whose self is knowledge"', is made only because it is an essential quality of the same (I. i 13.; II. iii. 29 & III. ii. 28). "Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a self is, there is no objection to the self being designated by that attribute. विज्ञानस्य यावदात्मनाविधर्मत्वात्तेन तद्व्यपदेशो न दोषः since in fact that quality contributes to define its (self's) essential character. स्वरूपनिर्वृणवधर्मत्वादित्यर्थः. Similarly, the intelligent highest self is called 'Bliss' (ānandamaya), because bliss is its essential quality as 'knowledge'. It cannot be maintained that it is *mere consciousness*.

This idea has been refuted so often and need not be refuted as many times again. But it has a real ground, because

1. "That which consists of understanding (vignāna) is the individual soul, not the internal organ (buddhi) only; for the formative element, Maya (consisting of vignānamaya) indicates a difference (between vignāna & vignānamaya). As vignānamaya can be explained as jiva, we have no right to neglect maya, as unmeaning, (I. i 13. pp. 213 & 214)

the observation that the different individuals have got the identical character of conscious subjects, gives rise to the plausible inference that they must have been plucked from one vast stretch of consciousness due to some mysterious power or limitation, say, avidya or upādhis. But the inference has got merely an air of plausibility, and is not founded on facts, nor is it conducive to logical explanation, of the relation between genus and individual, or concept and intuition. As will be showed in a succeeding paragraph, the whole misconception is due to this reversion of explanation which Platonically treats the 'idea' as the more perfect, and the individual as merely the 'manifestation' of the 'idea', which exactly is not the case. For, the concept is dependent on the intuition and not vice versa. If dependence is to be shown at all, the dependence is not on the side of the individual, in as much as there is the dependence of the former on the latter.

The fallacy of deriving the individual from the single source as Intelligence, is patent for a further reason. For whilst "substance is an individualised unity of concrete characters", when we "abstract from the original characters of two exactly similar substances, we are still left with a purely numerical point of difference, i. e. with a diversity of 'matter'. This 'matter' is 'signed' with quantity' i.e. it exists in numerically diverse portions and thus serves as the ultimate principle of individuation".¹ The individuality of each of these entities is a certain peculiarity, which whilst it expresses or gives expression to purposes identifiable with those of others or even of that ultimate intelligent being, yet holds its own individuality which cannot be identified with any original character (whether quality or relation), "marking it as numerically distinct from any other even exactly similar entity". Leibniz held that each monad though similar in character in being similar, was not identifiable with the rest even in the case of 'identity of indiscernables', for he held (perhaps a belief) that 'two different subjects A and B cannot have precisely the same individual affection; it being impossible that

the same individual accident should be in two subjects or pass from one subject to another." So much so, Prof. McTaggart remarks about the principle of *identity of indiscernables*, that it really is the 'principle of the *dissimilarity of the diverse*.' Every one of us has got individual experiences which cannot be communicated to others. They form our private or *individual-subjective*. Our dreams, even our emotions and perceptions, let alone the spiritual experiences, are our very own. Further "the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself and can explain the presence of unconscious and non-conscious states and acts, if it were only admitted that there are infinite individual selves who experience such states. If it were mere consciousness there could be no unconsciousness or veiling at all." (II. iii 32.) And also, if there were not so many individuals there must either be a wholesale veiling or wholesale emanicipation. But as Sámkhya showed, such is not the case ; and therefore there must be infinite souls (purushas or jivas). And since as Ramanuja states the soul always abides in bodies (merely sukshma or gross and sukshma, for when the soul leaves its physical body it carries its linga śarira with it, and has even in the realised condition a pure sattva शुद्धसत्त्व body capable of being utilised in every way by the soul) which only shows that for enjoyment or activity, a body is absolutely necessary, and there alone can consciousness take place not elsewhere. अस्माकं शरीरस्यान्तरेवावस्थितत्वादात्मनस्तत्रैवोपलब्धिनान्यत्रेति व्यवस्थासादः. (II. iii. 32).

In passing we may refer to the small discussion which Ramanuja engages in with the Bheda-bhedavádins.

a. Refuting the view of the Bheda-abheda vádins that the individual souls are identical and different from Brahman at the same time and are real though vanishing distinctions ultimately, an argument that strongly recalls the Bosanquetian theory,

1. Phil. Review. Jan. 1927. art. on *Principle of Individuation : Idea of God*. 264p. cf. "finite centres may 'overlap' indefinitely in content ex termini, they cannot 'overlap' at all in existence : their very raison d'être is to be distinct and in that sense, separate and exclusive focalisations,"

Ramanuja carefully analyses the question thus: "You (Bhedābheda vādins) have maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same thing viewed as effect and individual. But that this view is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show." He analyses in proceeding to show its untenability, the concept of genus and individual. He had in an earlier sutra (I. i. 1) suggested 'that the species is the form of the individual' व्यक्तेस्तु जातराकार इति तदाश्रयतया प्रतितिः. He states again in other words, that "genus constitutes the mode and the individual that to which the mode belongs". It is not a "fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of Unity in the same way as the admittedly uniform idea of an individual; for whenever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form 'this is such and such', it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode and that to which the attribute or mode belongs". (I. ii. 4.)

b. He says "the difference belongs to the individual and non-difference to the genus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a *double* aspect" (*italics mine.*) And if it be held that in one way a thing is non-different, and in the other, different, that is "the difference *and* non-difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects", then, "we have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects, but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character not their non-difference." And even if we concede that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects, constitutes a 'simultaneous difference and non-difference' 'in the thing which is' their 'substrate', how he asks, "can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes" viz. (difference and identity)? "If," he proceeds, "the two aspects on the one hand and the thing on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference, we shall be led into a *regressus in infinitum*" (I. ii. 4. pp. 194)

In commenting on Ramanuja for this criticism of the Bháskara theory, it is but legitimate that we should point out that whilst his criticism questions the foundations of the qualities of a thing taken as entities, cannot be legitimately compared to the individual thing itself, and that we should rather maintain that the individual is a thing not to be reduced into the ideas of relations which the non-difference or difference involves and which, as he justly points out, leads to the *infinitem ad regressus*, by calling into the bargain the unknown entity called the bare substrate into which these two aspects are introduced—we are forced to ask whether after all Ramanuja did justice to Bháskara? For whilst we can agree that 'similarity' or identity of constitution might legitimately be said to be the identical character, and the distinguishing character that which marks out the thing as semblent with or distinct from other things in general, we do not see the absurdity underlying such an identification of predicationary attributes as an introduction of entities into the substrate called the necessary third entity which, Ramanuja suggests, should be presumed. Further, one does not easily understand why the two so-called contradictory attributes cannot inhere in the same thing, for after all, the individual, as Ramanuja himself says, is the primary entity, and the similarity of character is said to be merely the attribute of such an entity. The difference is not an attribute at all but *merely the numerical point of difference in the existence* which cannot be dissolved at all, a difference which is all the same difference, in spite of the identity of nature between the several entities. As such, the argument is futile because it is the statement of real fact of existential individuality. So much so, we are led to ask whether Ramanuja is speaking of the *two words that have opposite connotations* or whether the two words apply to *two references of different kind between two objects* and might legitimately (a question of comparison being involved in such a reference of identity and difference) be referred to the same entity, in which case, no contradiction or infinite regress, *anávastha*, could take place. Ramanuja instead of entering into such dialectical disquisitions, might have refuted the school of Bháskara by pointing out the

fallacy underlying the assertion of non-eternality of the selves, and that single argument would suffice to make the theory of Bhāskara unacceptable. The criticism of Ramanuja of the Saptabhangivāda of Jainas needs must also be surrendered for the self-same reason of being merely futile and pointless.¹

By this argument which Ramanuja thinks is complete and most effective, the theory which holds that the Absolute is by the limitation of avidyakāmakarmaṇa, the three logical, moral and spiritual limitations or upādhus, sliced into the several individual selves, which at the end, become restored into the original substance of the Brahman, is absolutely demolished. This slicing into pieces or khandas in order to get at the jivas (souls) and things, is the only way by which the limitation might be successfully achieved, which method however, opens, the gates of atheistic materialism of Chārvākas, for matter alone is capable of being thus cut or sliced and never spirit, for it is exactly spirit which brings unity into existence, as such, itself akhanda. Ramanuja shows that once we refuse to acknowledge the specious simplicity of Māyavāda or advaita, we cannot halt at any half-way house of Bhāskara-vāda but must accept not only the reality of selves as Bhāskara does, but further admit that their existence is indissoluble into any simpler substances or substance. For Bhāskara, the world exists from the beginning of the creative impulse as distinct and indissoluble into its original source till the pralaya; in this he agrees with Ramanuja. But then, we must note the difference, namely, that Bhāskara does not admit the reality of matter as the eternally *related* and *subsumed entity* but only as the creative prakrit-shakti of God and also a spiritual entity in its essence. In a word, until the reality of all the three entities, matter, souls, and Brahman, the person who holds these former in an integral unity within himself, are all recognized there can be no way out of the impasse of solipsism and contradiction. "And it is false to maintain that

1. But it is better to note the skill with which the famous author opposes the other theory and in spite of real futility, it shows his sheer dialectical skill equal to that of the Māyavādin.

the individual self and the highest enter into any real union (absorption), for one substance cannot pass over into the nature of another entity or substance. परमात्मानयोर्गोः परमार्थ इतिष्यते मिथ्यैतदन्यद्वयं हि नैति तद्व्यतांततः (Vishnu Purana 2-14-27.)

Further there must be distinct selves seeking perfection, and if such a postulate that is self-evident for spiritual life, is declared to be unreal, then the power of agency in actions ethical, is lost; there can be no moral life or even such a thing as spiritual achievement. Ramanuja says that the fact that one 'knows' qualifies him for action. ज्ञानप्रसारे तु कर्तृत्वमस्त्येव (I. i. 1). Thus the finite self-hood, if it were a vanishing distinction, would, firstly, give no joy and certainly no satisfaction; secondly, such a distinction is perceived; thirdly to declare it unreal is to cut at the root of ethical and spiritual and religious aspiration. If it should merely mean that 'I' is a vanishing distinction and an unreal existence and deserves to be so annihilated in the Absolute, who shall exist to say, Ramanuja pertinently asks that *he* hath realised the absolute or *that* he is?

To therefore distinguish between spiritual entities and their attributes or quality of 'knowing' which constitutes their essential nature is quite valid, as it does away with the apparent simplicity underlying the advaita theory of reducing all finite selves into a vast experience with the help of an inexplicable Māya or avidya which creates these focalisations on its bosom without involving it at all—mere individualiti-less foci and imperfections of an all-embracing Anubhūti.

To be for a subject, is to know. In which case, the natural extension for a subject's cognitive activity when uninterferred with by any media, would be cognition of the whole of reality. Our problem then would be, not what we know, but why we do not know what we ought to know? How does this limitation arise in the sphere of our cognitive area? And why life being what it is, the function of the self implies a necessary and natural residence of it in the body? And if the quantitative or spatial reference apply not to the souls' size (as it seems inevitable that we cannot but speak of it in such a way) how does it habitate the body and hold its strings in direction and function of the

organism in all its actions without whose residence or presence, (unless we are going to hold along with the Chárvakas and the Behaviourists of the present day, that there is no soul or self or even a conscious spiritual subject, all being due to the interactions of the cerebral cortical spheres with the stimuli transmitted through the neurones to it) no activity could be possible? Self, conceived in the Spiritual sense or the Leibnizian sense of qualitative infinitesimal (as the quantitative and spatial applies to the atoms), should have an operative centre in the body through which it animates its particular body, dominates and enjoys itself in it, and realises its own true nature as a subject acting in conjunction with an overflowing intelligence it discovers afterwards, an Intelligence it recognizes as the final destiner and goal of the physical and moral and spiritual order.' (II. iii. 39-40). The question of exact residence is perhaps a matter of belief and, Vedánta along with Yoga, keeps it resident in the heart, operating from that central point both the head as also the limbs.

1. Ramanuja recognizes through his attack on the nirguna Brahman of Advaita, that a bare being is a nonentity and is a meaningless concept. So also a mere point of bare existence is also meaningless. (II. iii. 34). The individual self though it apparently appears to be such a bare point of existence when not in conjunction with the nature during the pralaya-kála, is not such a bare existentiality. The functional attitude is available to such a focus and depositary which the self is in reality, only when such an attitude is encouraged by being in a relational attitude of subject-object (*samyoga*) with nature which forms the world of realisation of ethical observance and action and its conscious commerce with God or reason expressed in such an objective system. It is this relational attitude and dependence on nature and God which makes it the real self it is, that rescues it from being the bare point of mere existence identifiable with any material atom. The individual self, thus possesses the triple character of *Gñatritva*, and *Kartritva* *bhoktritva* of cognition, conation and sensation or enjoyment. But its independence all the while remains and in no case is it sundered even by the highest, for that would remove the character of the soul as a spiritual and moral entity or individual. Its continued identity is the independence that it possesses in its own right. (II. 3. 41). These characteristics constitute the "partial similarity", their dissimilarity however, consists in their diversity of state or function.

Logically speaking, the individual finite existence of the self is a primary certainty. The individual selves also exist in the same way as independent entities, a fact of inferential existence as even the most barefaced absolutists and nihilists have to accept, and which all idealists worth their philosophy maintain, or a fact of direct cognition as the Intuitionists hold. This fact of recognition of other individual centres of consciousness is *inferential* it is claimed, but there is no other reason for that opinion but the prejudice against realism. And accepting it to be such, there is no reason to hold it to be mainly inferential. Perhaps the fact of calling it mainly inferential-necessity is a logical necessity as well, not only on account of the actual cognition of other bodies made up in the same way as our own, but it involves a mixing up of each of our private universes if there is an identification of the different private universes, which is not the case. As Ramanuja maintains, there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual experiences of each of us, our enjoyments and realisations only if concede to the infinite (uncountable) selves, reality, eternity, and immortality. (II. iii. 48).

4. *The individual soul is a part of Brahman.*

The specific term part, *amśa*, leads to the question of the relation between whole and part. If the part were to be treated in terms of extension and the whole too treated in the same way, then we would be confronted with the problem whether the whole is extended and material, and Brahman being conceived as the whole, is material.

Ramanuja therefore defines a part: 1stly, it is not a part of extension (beginning with defining firstly with what it is not) of Brahman as all imperfections would belong to Brahman. 2ndly, nor is it a piece of Brahman as Brahman does not admit of being divided into pieces (*khandas*) (II. iii. 42).

3rdly, defining it in terms of what it is, it is a part in the sense "that it constitutes one place (*deśa*) of something and hence a distinguishing attribute (*viśeshana*) is a part of the thing

distinguished by that attribute. (II. iii. 46) एकवस्त्वेकदेशत्वं व्यक्तत्वं विविक्त-
स्थैकस्य वस्तुनो विशेषणमशेषम् ।

Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand towards each other in the relation of part and whole (amśamsibhāva), yet we observe in them an essential difference of character. And "as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it"—an attribute sustained in the relation by it. As the Sri Bhāṣya passage runs, "Lustre is an attribute not to be realised apart from the gem, and therefore is a part of the gem;" the same relation holds good between generic character and individuals having that character, and qualities and things having qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way, souls as well as nonsentient matter stand to Brahman in the relation of parts (amśa) (III. ii. 28). And whenever difference is declared, it is this difference in character (svabhāvavailakshanyam) a definite spreading out of this relation between substance and attribute that is made. Whenever on the other hand, unity or nondifference is declared "they are based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance they distinguish and hence are fundamentally valid" (II. iii. 45). अभेदनिर्देशान्तु पृथक्सिद्धयर्हविशेषणानां विशेष्यपर्यन्तत्वमश्रित्य मुख्यत्वेनोपपद्यन्ते ।

In the sense of attribute-nature (viśeshanatva) which is one of essential dependence for sustenance for its very being upon a substrate which is its ground, the individual self is a part of the substance which is whole and full in itself and absolutely indivisible.

So also the world and Brahman stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, "the former being like the light the latter like the luminous body, or the former like the power and the latter like that in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body the latter being like the soul" (II. iii. 46). एतं प्रभाप्रभावद्रूपेण, शक्तिशक्तिसद्रूपेण, शरीरीत्मभावेन, चांशांशिभावं जगद्ब्रह्मणोः ।

It is clear from what has been stated that this interpretation of the relation between whole and part, is peculiar to this

system alone, as it alone translates that relation to one of substance and attribute Spinoza had, however, done like-wise; but here unlike there, no method of conversion has been undertaken. There is a suspicion in Spinoza's system whether when he deduces more *geometrico*, he is thinking of a part or mode as a *khandā* (piece). Ramanuja obviates any such difficulty by his specific interpretation of the relation in the way sketched above. The advantages of the interpretation of Ramanuja are patent and decidedly more than others. The attributes have relations, integral and vital with the substance, just as a part has got to the whole, for where can a part be except as a part-of-the-whole or an attribute except as an attribute-of-a-substance?—yet that attribute could be called a part (*amsa*) without impairing either the perfection of the whole of which it is a part or *amśa*, or losing its own specific individuality as *amśa*. The connection has not got the defect of de-spiritualisation of the Spirit, which we have somehow accepted to be the whole, and yet it does not dematerialise matter except in the sense of making it a fuller external expression of spirit's activities, making it yield to the stress of the spirit, in making it the nature it is. Nor even does it throw all individualisation or individuality to mere continuity of the unindividualised. Whilst guaranteeing to individual selves and *Prakṛiti* (*śakti*) an individual eternity (though they are, to a great extent in the former case, and entirely, in the latter case, different from *their* substance) they could yet be called '*mamaivāmśa*' as the Gita passage runs (XV. 7).

Whilst the comparisons hold legitimately (holding of course, that they are no other than mere analogies) yet there is underlying them a suggestion of a spiritual notion of the relation of part to the whole, since it does away with the faulty conception of part as material part or even as a spiritual part which can be extinguished (as Bhāskara held) in the absolute's vast bosom when it attains fulness of perfection gradually. Ramanuja himself condemns any other notion as mere *abhāsa* (mere argument); for the arguments which seek to prove the being whose nature is absolutely uniform light i.e. Intelligence or consciousness but differentiated by limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) is fallacious, for

“obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light.” (II.iii.49.) प्रकाशैकस्वरूपस्य प्रकाशतिरोधानं प्रकाशनाश एवेति प्रागेवोपपादितम् ॥ And further this argument would ruin the conception of spirit too fatally. But in the sense argued above, the finite is not *derived* from the infinite since by such a derivation the finite could not be, if its aggregation with the rest should give back the infinite again. The presence of the finite would be the death of the infinite as an actual or acting existence and vice versa. The conception of Ramanuja of the part is a spiritual relation as contradistinct from spiritual derivation between whole and part. It is not a derivative relation at all. In which case, not only need the souls *alone* be the parts (because they are spiritual entities), but also matter, which stands as a dependent existence as a mode or dharma of the spirit, whose svabháva is so obverse to that of spirit, can be a part. The souls are finite, and as finites they could continue to exist even though they may attain to the infinity of knowledge, and that does not mean loss of infinity to Brahman. There is no subterfuge employed here to arrive at the finites through either the imposing of a real or unreal upádhi or máya, as real differences are explainable by a direct vision and experience viz. of the perceived integral relation between Brahman and the souls-and-nature, which can easily be translated into one of whole-part. But the merit of realising this simple procedure is entirely Ramanuja's contribution to Philosophy. Further this relation alone is relevant to the discussion of the eternity of the individuality of the ego. Matter also thus, as already pointed out, stands in the relation of a mode and amśa of Brahman.”

“The material embodiments like those of man etc. possess equally with generic and other qualifications, the character of being entirely dependent on the individual self, the character of being *serviceable only to that self* and the character of being a mode of of that self. So also the individual selves with their embodiments form the body of the Highest Self and possess the characteristic of his modes.” “This highly subtle matter stands to Brahman the cause of the world, in the relation of a mode (prakára) and it is Brahman viewed as having such a mode.”

Viewed thus, the primary fact that emerges out of this discussion is that the attribute can be conceived to be the body of the substance; secondly, that, as such, it can also be considered as the part of the substance; thirdly, that the part need not on the above two scores, be of the same nature as the substance of which it is an attribute, indeed, that it can be of a very obverse nature, provided it satisfies the definition of a body or attribute or part, and that of being absolutely serviceable to its substance or subject.

Recapitulating the chapter;

Substance is Spirit and the ultimate ground and cause. (cf. 1st chapter.) The concept of substance in Ramanuja's Philosophy is at once concrete, universal, and real. It is concrete because it is not a generic character or a general idea or a formal attribute, but an actual and acting presence qualified by qualities of perfection. It is not an abstraction from existence, every other thing which exists outside it alone is an abstraction. In one sense, it is that which guides the process towards the highest emergence of perfection in the time-series. It is not abstracted from existence either by being made into a passive background on which is superimposed the fluctuating veil of Nature or Prakriti, nor is it abstracted from reality, existing as an inferred idea, essentially timeless, because having no actuality. On the other hand, it is concrete, because, whilst standing as the eternally unchanging (in constitution qua spirit) permanent, it functions through the universal process, which it holds in absolute dependent-relation, enduring as a dynamic existence at once compelling everything, though never compelled. (cf. Kena Up.) It is timeless because it controls time, and eternity means enduring through out time सर्वकालवर्तमानत्वं हि नित्यत्वम्, and uses time to execute its own purposes and ends, which, at best, are a revelation of its own Bliss and a movement of Ananda. Having its own purposes and ends and having the power to achieve them, this Absolute Intelligence is the supreme Person, or personality, and we may agree with Bhāskara in maintaining it to have no specific form, or with Ramanuja in holding it to have a perfect form (सर्वकल्याणगुणमूर्तित्वं).

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God, between Nature and the Jivas, are real. Relations bind only when the dominancy of the objective is characterised by a gripping impotency on the part of the subject, though, even there, the subject does, however inadequately fashion its object. On the other hand, when the subject completely utilises and values its object, then the subject is no longer impotent but is the lord of the object. This measure of potency determines the superiority of Brahman, the Absolute Kshètragna or Knower, over the individuals, which measure they do not attain even in their most perfect stage, for they cannot be capable of starting or withdrawing creation. (I. i. 2. जन्मादस्य यतः IV. iv, 17. जगद्धापाखर्जम्, समानो ज्योतिष) though they are then capable of equal enjoyment (IV. iv. 21.) and attain to equality, samatvam, with the highest. But it may, even then be possible for them to perform miracles, and to determine nature's functions, even as Visvámitra did in creating a new heaven for Trisanku, but they are even then bound by the will of God. Imperfection cannot cling to Brahman, in the shape of contact with nature or with bodies in its incarnations, for as the passage runs "connexion with one and the same body is for the individual a source of disadvantage, while for the highest Brahman, it is nothing of the sort, but constitutes an accession of glory, in so far as it manifests him as Lord and ruler" (III. ii. 13) एकस्मिन्नेव देहसंयोगे जीवस्याशुरुषार्थं परस्य तु तदभावं नियमनरूपैश्वर्यवित्तीति योगं ।

The relation of substance to its predicates or the modes is made to give the cue to every other relation, viz. subject-object, soul-body, whole-part. The part need not be of the nature of the whole, the whole may be spiritual, the part may be material. The whole may not be conceived in terms of extension, the part then could not be derived; as such the part should not be conceived as a khanda or piece of the whole, but only as its inseparable (aprathiksiddha) conjunct.

That which determines the character of the part is its entire dependence on the substance, though khandatva does obtain in the limited sense to material things. Dependence

determines *amśatva*, superiority determines substantiveness, *viśeṣhya*, and wholeness. This absolute dependence being the character of Nature (*jagat*) and the *Jivas*, they constitute as such the parts of Brahman.

Concluding, the ultimate substance is One¹ only, it is Intelligence not mere consciousness (*anubhūti* or *saṃvid*). The substance is a qualified personality. It has got internal relations as within itself between its modes nature and *jivas* which form its *prakāra*. These *prakāras* are *aprathikṣiddha* or inseparable.² Brahman is the one supreme existence. God with his predicates or God-as-with-his-worlds-and-selves in the Real ultimate truth (*Satyam*), not an unrelated bare being or Consciousness. This Ultimate Being stands as the Ultimate Synthesis, the Real Unity, and is the Absolute, real, universal, and Spiritual. He is not something unknowable but something eminently experienceable. He is inexpressible in words, for "from him all speech turns away", but he is the cause of speech. He is a patent wonder not an unknowable. "Religion is lost if it sinks into the morass of the unknowable infinite in which it can have no foothold," as a Philosopher says, and Ramanuja being essentially a religious man, finds that in the last resort, the creed that condemns man eternally to a limitation of knowledge is false. His Brahman is eminently knowable, lovable, and reciprocative.

1 *Nyaya Siddhanjanam : Vedanta Charya*. अशेषचिद्विद्वत् प्रकारं ब्रह्म ; एकमेवतत्त्वं ।

2. cf. *Ramanuja's Conception of Jiva as a Prakara of Isvara*. Prof. P. N. Srinivāsa Chārya.

CONCLUSION.

I

In the first chapter can be distinguished two broad views of causal relation which can never be identified with each other, though that chapter has left it without drawing out clearly the manifest differences between those two. Sri Ramanuja himself does not set forth clearly his two views as distinct from each other, and perhaps, identifies one view with the other, as will be showed, in order to yield a unitary conception of Brahman as the sole cause.

The first view maintains that there is an identity between the causal-totality and effect-totality, the only difference being the difference of condition (avastha), the former unseminal condition of reality (avyakta) becoming the manifest actual condition ; the undistinguished into names and forms, passing into the distinguished by names and forms. This reality considered as the totality is not Brahman *merely*, but Brahman as with his modes (chid-achid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman.) In which case, the assertion of the total cause as being equal and identical with and having in potentiality all the physical manifestation of the effect within its own bosom, is expressed by the statement “there is non-difference between cause and effect. कारणद्वयात्कार्यम्”. The upádána, material cause thus would be the Brahman with Prakriti, its absolute dependent.

With the help of this view, Ramanuja is enabled to accept Satkāryaváda, as also the synthetic relation implied by such an acceptance, that causes as well as effects are as real or as unreal as their effects or causes, for the effectual state is merely the manifestation of the causal or a distinguishing of the cause into names and forms (náma-rúpa vibhajana.)

The second view, however, is not the same, as the former, because the causal condition of the totality of existence is distinguished as within itself as constituted by three entities, viz.,

Brahman, the intelligent finites (jivas) and Matter, the latter two being regarded as the effects of the former. This means that the causal relation is again introduced in the relations subsisting between the entities which compose the whole of reality. But such an application of the causal law is manifestly different from the causal view propounded in the former. The former view, as already pointed out, takes the whole of reality as passing into another condition, the latter view, on the other hand, holds the causal view to mean that *conditionedness means effectedness*. The former view leads to the conception of the upádána káрана of the universe or the material cause; the latter view leads to the conception of the transcendental conditioner or effector of changes seen in the primal elements or constituents of the whole, viz. the changes of contraction and expansion of the range of consciousness in the individual selves as seen in the evolution of different grades of existence, such as the lowest forms of life in the unicellular organisms upto the highest forms of life as typified in the conscious beings, men and gods, if any; and the drastic changes of the raw matter or prakṛiti as seen in its infinite splitting or cleavage into infinite forms of physical and physiological organs which form the bodies of the selves. According to the latter view, the cause is not the totality that passes into another condition, but merely the external destiner of changes, the transcendental enjoyer, and the immanent sustainer of them both, being their conditioner. He is the condition of their being what they are.

In this sense, and in this sense only and with the help of this second view alone, is Ramanuja enabled to equate the causal relation to the soul-body relation and not otherwise. The definition which he gives for what a body constitutes is extended to every one of the other important relations, viz. whole-part, substance-mode or attribute, and in every case, pointed to obtain and satisfy the definition of the body. Thus Ramanuja manages to reduce all relations to one typical and unitary relation or conception of soul-body (शरीरिश्चरीरभावः.)

This second view also helps him to postulate reasonably the unchanging nature and incorruptible perfection of the

Brahman, who is their Cause in the second sense. He is unchanging, because he is the external destiner as also the internal moral governor and the immanent sustainer of the process, and also because, Spirit is incorruptible and cannot undergo such drastic changes of complexion as matter does, it being merely the purposive volitive ideal of the process of matter's changes, and perhaps, throughout its strivings it always maintains the character of the *demiurge* in nature. And in so remaining unchanging, he persists as the incorruptible overlord of the process, destining with his character of Spirit he is, the unfolding of nature.

By combining both these views, Ramanuja seeks to make Brahman both the immanent cause, as according to the first view of the totality passing into another condition, as also the transcendent cause as illustrated by the second view, of the whole creation. He finds sufficient reason for maintaining that at the beginning 'He alone was', because no one can distinguish, not only historically in the beginning or cause the distinguishing of names and forms, but even logically, no one ought to disjunct the inseparable relations (*aprathiksiddha*) from one another, and treat them as two separate entities, that can be described to exist apart from one another. For wherever there is a body, there is present its soul, and we do not make any definite judgment, such as 'there is a body', 'here is the soul or mind', as if they are wandering terms; on the other hand, we only judge 'so and so is there', a judgment that gives the *higher* among them a specific name and *means by it the related both*.

Brahman according to the first view, then, is Brahman as integrally related to the jivas and the prakriti which form its modes, and for the reason aforesaid can be called He, though correctly speaking, we must speak of it as "He as qualified by his modes" alone was. In the second view, Brahman is distinguished as the superior to every other term, as such the most perfect, the omniscient and omnipotent, full of perfections and auspicious qualities, standing as the intimate self, *antaryámin*, of all. Also the final end of all is he, he being the most perfect being. The second position does not leave Brahman as merely a copy of the God of Deism or Nyáya-Vaiśeṣika, who is the mere maker of the world.

But God is regarded to mean the religious ideal, near and dear to all selves because of the relation which subsists between God and the modes which constitute the Jagat, which relation is not such a slender one nor even a dispensable one. When this fact is once realised and valued, we are at once shunted up to the first position that at no stage of evolution, in its causal or effectual condition, was there any separate existence for either, nor was the relation wanting at any time, since they (God and the universe) were bound to each other in an organic bond forming a unitary existence. अतस्सर्वदा चिदचिद्वस्तुतया तत्प्रकारम् ब्रह्म :

The second section deals about the process of differentiation according to the Ramanuja theory, the monism of the theory being shown by the unity of control and direction of substance or spirit. And the modes of such a spirit can never be deduced from such a spirit or even conceived to be so derived from a unitary source as do the modern zoologists viz. Haeckel, etc. Even the biologist philosopher, Bergson, does not find it difficult to postulate a unitary principle such as Spirit to be the ultimate from which matter and the rest take their source, even though their cleavage takes place according to the three major currents or phases of reflex, instinct and intelligence. But Ramanuja finds it difficult to accept such a single-source derivation of the triune entities of matter, finite intelligences and Brahman from any other source¹ or from Brahman itself. He rather sees that instead of taking such risks of deduction, he could as well make the two others as not derived yet as dependent and completely subject to the Highest among them, namely, Brahman. And with the help of the definition he had given of what a body is, he could make all the triune entities assume a unitary appearance or unity. The deep realism of his theory made it an impossible assumption that he could ever dissolve or attempt to so dissolve, or surrender to the siren-song of metaphysical abstractionism of Buddhistic metaphysics.

The real evolution or change consists in the attitudes that primal matter assumes and the forms it takes, when in contact

1. cf. Yādava Prakāśa's Philosophy which resembles Bergson's just as Bhāskara's resembles Fichte's.

with the individual selves, which in turn are willed to assume contraction of consciousness for the purpose of action in the world. Such actions are destined by God at the beginning of creation, so that there may be a real evolution in the bodies of the finite individuals and a corresponding enlargement of consciousness in them and a beautiful manifestation of perfection in Nature. The knowledge, namely, that they have a superior to whom they have to be loyal, which is also at the very moment the imponent of moral law and the intimate self of ours, is requisite to the individuals to be more able to control nature and thus be more perfect.

This obligation to fulfil god's will is (when understood) the transcendental moral law and spiritual word, and when not understood, is the fate or Karma. It is out of the scope of the present thesis to attempt to sketch anything like a definition of what karma means, as it is allied to the ethical problem, rather than to the metaphysical. However, it is well to suggest here that there are two meanings for that word, one which means action, and another which means the result of actions and the perpetuation of cosmic justice due to such actions or action. Fate means the latter view, which signifies the perpetuation of such divine justice resulting from our actions, good or evil. As to the bondage resulting from such actions good and bad, it is, as already pointed out, the stamp of material environmental adjustments, when considered in the material sense; and considered in the moral sense, the bondage is the infliction of greater suffering on the individual who has acted irrespective of the cosmic law, which cosmic order causes such cosmic repurcussions and reactions to affect the individual. Thus these organs of ours are not our own make or creation, but only the make of our actions or karma, its environment, however, is due to the cosmic reaction and make-up accordingly. These organs are not self-determined, but they are rather determined by the actions that have issued from us in this or prior life or lives, which have been motivated towards selfish ends and by desires equally egoistic and selfish.

The differentiating takes place in the sāmkhyan order till the cosmic elements are formed in order, and in their combinations is placed the cosmic seed, which contains all the bound selves under the cosmic governance of Brahma or Hiranyagarbha (as he is the first to issue from the cosmic egg). Then the gradual unfoldment of animals, plants, men and gods etc., take place as also the panchékarana-prakriya or intermixture of elements in specific proportions to form the various actual elements and things.

The third section defends the realistic thesis that substance is no bare being but is always substance as qualified by qualities and modes or relations. It is not mere consciousness, nor experience devoid of distinctions of subject and object. It defends the thesis that subject and object are coeval and one cannot be merged or derived or surrendered in reality, so as to lose self-identity of its own nature. They are a Unity in distinction.

Consciousness is the function of the ego and cannot be treated as the ultimate of which the ego is a centralisation or focalisation. The ego is the spirit or intelligence; consciousness is the activity of the cognizing subject and is found whenever the subject cognizes. It is the sphere of consciousness that is limited, as has been more than once hinted at, and never the ego. It would involve the annihilation of the ego itself, if it be limited by the overlaying of Máya, in case it be *mere consciousness*. The range of consciousness is the experiential limit of the subject, and it has got a potentiality of infinite extension or knowing capacity.

From considerations such, as the above, it follows that the substance is characterised by two properties, i. e. modes and qualities. Modes are the relationed terms of a substance, dependent on the substance for very being. These predicates or 'modes' are distinguished from the qualities by their having in turn qualities or *gunas*, which might be the same in kind as that of the substance, or of quite a different kind. These modes, *prakāra* as Ramanuja calls them, are modes because they are dependent on another and are not independent *in behaviour* though they

are independent *in existence*. Or more correctly, a mode has a specific individuality in existence, a certain distinguishable character, it is an entity (dravya) making it an *other* though inseparable existence. *The definition of mode is its lesser perfection as a thing and dependence which follows such a lesser perfection, making it the mode of such an entity as can control, and direct, and guide, because of its inherent superiority of character over its "others" or modes.* Quality is *this inherent determiner of character of superiority or inferiority of the terms*. It is that which is the measure of perfection, or grade of attainment. The qualities of brihatva, omnipotence, and omniscience determine the superiority of Brahman over the modes viz. finite selves and matter (prākṛiti), the former, because it cannot compete with Brahman, so far as the cosmic controlling power is concerned, which power is the special prerogative of the Highest or Brahman, a fact that determines Brahman's greatness; the latter, as it is by essential nature unintelligent, as such exists to be utilised by God, or Spirit or Intelligence, the Supreme Person.

This same fact also determines its wholeness and indivisibility, akhandatva, because a part, considered spiritually, is merely the extension of the spirit and not a cut-out portion of the spirit. It is merely a specific function or focus of activity of the Spirit in its self-manifestation. The part is thus an absolute dependent of the whole, and not necessarily a piece of the whole, as in the case of material portions of a material whole. This explanation gets the advantage of not being culpable of the injustice against matter by dematerialising it or against spirit by materialising it. It secures the general principle, that matter can be at once a part, amśa, of spirit and yet can exist as itself i.e. as-matter.

Thus the identity expressed by such clauses as 'The world is He' are founded on the principle that Brahman or Viṣṇu pervades the world as its self, in the character of its inward ruler; and is not founded on *unity* of substance (vastu or dravya) of

the pervading principle and the world pervaded¹. For one substance (dravya) cannot pass over into the nature of another substance²

II

In concluding and evaluating the philosophy of Sri Ramanuja, we have to analyse the method and the positions which Ramanuja holds.

The method of Ramanuja is ontological and not epistemological. It does not start from the question of a theory of knowledge, but only from the character of the Existent. Neither does it hold that what is perceived only exists, but what exists is perceivable, and the character of the existent is not something added, conditioned, or manufactured by the knowing subject. Nor is it a method that thinks that subject-object relation is the starting point in any ontological enquiry. The epistemological conclusion is only a portion of the ontological and supports the ontological.

Ramanuja is an idealist in the sense of accepting Spirit to be the ultimate substance, and not in the sense that Idea is the ultimate. The "Absolute Idea" theory suits the Neo-Hegelian writers, and the Transcendental Idealism suits the epistemological mind of Kant and Sankara perhaps.

Ramanuja accepts no triadic synthesis of the Hegelian system, And one can confidently assert that no system of Indian Thought accepts such a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis-movements. But he independently accepts the theory of distincts of Signor Croce, though it is also quite apparent that there is no such circular ideal progression of the distincts. There is implication without transition and ascent maintained, though one must not I think in an epistemological or logical enquiry as that of Croce, refuse such an ascent or transition in thought as well as life.

1. जगत्त इदं च तादात्म्यमन्तर्यामिरूपेणऽत्मतयाव्याप्तिकृतम् न तु व्याप्यव्यापकायावै-
र्यैस्त्वकृतम् ॥ I. ii. 1.

2. परमात्मात्मानोर्योगः परमार्थे इतीष्यते । मिथ्यैतदन्यद्द्रव्यं हि नैति तद्द्रव्यतायतः ॥ Vishnu
Purana 2. 14. 21.

The substance Ramanuja accepts, is the substance of ordinary conception, a "thing" different though never apart from its qualities, even the aggregate of qualities, which form its "nature", since qualities as qualifying in turn qualities would lead to infinite regress, which is the case, even in the case of relations where the terms of the relation are reduced to relations. The qualities in the aggregate define the "nature of the thing" (svarūpa) though we must definitely hold that the "thing" is the substance which is *related* in quite a different, perhaps, more definitely immanent way than the relations. There is no substance which has not qualities and relations. And as relations are "between" things, atleast between two things, there follows that there are bound to be many substances. But the Monism which Ramanuja achieves is peculiar to his system alone as it reduces all the many substances to the level of a unitary existence called the Brahman in which they move, and live and have their Being. The relations which characterise Brahman is "with" his modes, which form *with* him the unitary reality or Existent. And for the reasons adduced already, with the help of implication of distincts under the superior, the Higher among them is called to be the truth, which means also the reality and truth of the lower as existing *with* the Higher as its mode, amśa or Prakāra, or Viśeshana, or Sarira.

Unlike Berkeley, Leibniz, and McTaggart, Ramanuja holds to the reality of Nature or Matter more definitely though he is cautious enough to assert, and herein is his best known and cardinal point of his system—that the relation between the Absolute Spirit and Matter is one of soul and body; the Pervading and the Pervaded stand in, the relation of "Sariri-Sarira bhāva" or Soul-body relation, which relation is never absent at any time. It is this relation and the qualities of pervading, sustaining and enjoying and other infinite derivative characteristics of omniscience, omnipotence issuing from the characteristic of spirit, which is Truth, Intelligence and Eternity, Satyam, Gnānam, Anantham, that make Brahman really Existent as substance. Therefore is Brahman Saguna and Saviśeṣa, where characteristics of relation and qualities are in force.

Therefore the whole trend of Ramanuja's enquiry is founded upon the *character of the existent* which is *reality*, and not a something called Reality, achieving or self-fulfilling or self-fulfilled, and at an end. The ultimate is spirit as controlling, supporting and enjoying matter and individual selves, and as the Existent is never anything without this relation, it stands to argue that spirit is the soul or substance whose predicates are the worlds and selves. The relation thus becomes an immanent relation not convertible into quality by any means but absolute all the same. The relations as between the different individual selves (which are substances also) and matter are external relations.

But the method is not inductive essentially as might be seen, it is *a priori*, meaning by such an assertion, that the initial belief starts from the Sabda or the Scriptures which include all the range of mythical and Philosophic lore and the Pancharátra ágama, too. The meaning of the *priori* then is not western in any sense as before experience, though that too forms a portion of the way of inquiry. But the ontological method seeks help or refuge or verification from the "Character of the Existent", and therefore Ramanuja whenever he asserts the reality of experience, of relations and qualities, calls upon the enquirer to look to perception-data and sense-data and even goes far enough to assert that whenever there is a hopeless rift between our experience in its purity and that of the Scriptural statement, it is our experience that ought to count. But all the same, he is content to affirm that the Scriptures are not contradictory to experience at all, if only one interprets them naturally.

III

In evaluating any philosophic system that claims truth, it is necessary that we should pay less heed to its special theological views, which may be true or false or merely fantastic and imaginary, whilst they may interest us by their novelty or freshness as such. Our aim consists in evaluating its logical satisfactoriness. But this initial statement is not meant to mean anything against the religious and ethical ideals that, in fact, form the bed-rock of

life, and without which there can be no endeavour towards logical reconstruction of experience at all. Far from such an obnoxious limitation of the sphere of philosophising to mere consistent intellectual formulation of partial phases of reality, as defined by the causal sequence, and evolution, and ontological status of Being, and whilst never forgetting to value a truth for its truth-claim, we should always correct our truth-valuation by its ethical and religious results and consequences, and seek to satisfy those demands of the soul, more demanding, indeed, than even truth. For as Lotze says, "the beginning of metaphysics is not in itself but in ethics".¹ Consistency every or any system may have, but consistency is not everything either in logic or in ethics: for whilst a theory may be a consistent formulation as far as it goes, it may not be true, though it is certainly true to assert that truth is and should be consistent. So also everything useful is not true, though truth must needs be useful. Truth must satisfy; and has an intrinsic character of satisfaction. Value is the corrective to Truth. In such relative degrees as any philosophical system achieves the world-view in all its diverse real phases, and formulates its theory consistent with such a world-view, it approximates to reality. And further, as Śrī Vedānta Deśika somewhere² very finely puts it, no system can claim reality or truth because it is a view or belief that has been prevailing from time immemorial, and deride another view because it is a thing of yesterday; the only test that can determine truth is when it has stood the test of experience, just as gold when rubbed against touchstone proves its purity from other alloys.

Reality in its manifestation reveals its potential beauty and goodness and sustains itself by its truth-character. Reality manifests itself because, to *bhava* is to *manifest*. It manifests not on account of any want of perfection which it seeks to attain, nor in the way that evil and falsity make themselves commendable and

1. "There is nothing more real than what comes in religion... The man who demands a reality more solid than that of religious consciousness knows not what he seeks". *Appearance and Reality*. Bradley. p. 449.

2. *Yatiraja Saptati* 57 Sloka.

appreciable. Evil and falsity have a borrowed and disguised character which by an 'effort' seek to attain a dignity they essentially have not. Reality, on the other hand, does not seek by an 'effort' to *be*; it self-realises itself, it appreciates itself in its own manifestations. Its existence cannot be challenged, nor can its self-appreciating process, which the universe of manifestation is. Its appreciableness and commendability, its truth, beauty, and goodness, is its very positive character; its value consists in itself. Reality thus having such a character of intrinsic value, cannot be said to have no effective existence. But to have an effective existence is to be self-manifest. Evolution is this outward and extended character of reality in its self-manifestative activity. Its living is its evolution or manifestation of beauty and goodness. Thus value, or intrinsic value, is the fire-test that truth has to stand, before it can claim truth. Truth and value are intrinsically bound together. Virtue is knowledge, said Socrates, and Ramanuja agrees with him in holding that not only is knowledge virtue, but that knowledge is power. From being to expression, from truth to goodness, from knowing to activity, is the inevitable transition. To gain knowledge is to give to activity a divine positive intrinsicity of truth-character, namely, goodness. The practical expression of a theoretic truth may be defined to be goodness. The attempt at the knowledge of reality (Brahmajigñāsa) is made, not only because such an effort is intrinsically valuable as throwing open to us new vistas of experiences, but also because, it is the only way by which one is enabled to live a good life, a life in tune with the infinite reality, its purposes, and infinite ends. (I. i. 1.)

A denial of life and its values or value, involves a denial of reality and its life, and such a denial is not only a self-contradiction but a self-stultification. It is based on an increasing anxiety to get rid of life, a tendency towards morbid quietism. It is a moral revulsion which over-emphasized translates itself either into scepticism or nihilism or mysticism or all of them in quick succession, because thought cannot rest content in any or all of these. Such is the transition and evolution of Buddhist thought which

ran through all these above phases culminating in Advaita, its last phase and logical product. It is thus life that in its movement leads to such typhoons in the thought-sphere. It reveals how far the practical revulsions may determine the logical, and defeat its purposes, but that does not imply the non-utility of truth or the unreality of the practical.

Any theory that doubts the truth or reality of the life of spirit, or its worth, treating them to be either as unreal or phenomenal or subjective and imaginary, firstly, has involved itself in self-contradiction, because it is an affirmation of the impossibility of knowledge, which affirmation is itself an affirmation of the knowledge about it; secondly, has involved itself in self-stultification, because it is an affirmation of the unattainability of real goodness or worth, which evaluation is itself a valuation. Thus once we grant that thought (our thought) can know reality as it is in itself and does not *make* it or *distort* it, and that reality is expressive, because of its fulness, and for the self-same reason, exhibits or self-manifests itself to itself through selves or minds, and once we grant also that truth has got intrinsic value, which means a value not dependent on any one mind, nor many minds, that is, neither individual-subjective nor social-subjective, but universal or general-subjective, as valuable in its own merit, and that the effectivity of truth is its capacity to aid a greater realisation of ourselves, and that Truth is not only achievable but worth achieving, since it gives a positivity to activity, and power to the act or volition, then we steer clear off the clogging channels of scepticism and self-contradiction.

Activity binds only when it is done through ignorance of the laws of the world, through ignorance of God and his will. As the famous Isha Upanishad verse runs 'action clings not to man, न कर्म लिप्यते नरे, and one should seek to live a hundred years doing action, कुर्वन्नवेह कर्मोणि जिजीविषेत् शतसमा: (Isha 2.) And later on, the same upanishad goes on to say that through Avidya (meaning by that action) one crosses over death, through Vidya, he gains immortality अविद्याया विदुः तत्त्वा विद्याया अमृतमश्नुते. There is nothing that should make us shirk from action. Action, not knowledge

is the final effort. Knowledge leads to perfect action, and action directed towards knowledge gives perfect knowledge. They are mutual dependents, forming an *ideal* circular progression leading to the *actual* spiral ascent of individual life leading to *perfect knowledge*, and therefore, *perfect action*, योगः कर्मसु कौशलम्.

Such considerations as the former, lead to the view that a pure monism such as the static Absolute of Advaita is unmeaning and contradictory of experience, since all process is ruled out as unreal and fictitious, and all activity, even of manifestation of itself and its perfections, is declared to be an activity of egoism, as such, is unreal, and cannot and ought not to be predicated of the Absolute. But wherein lies its worthiness or commending character? It cannot commend itself to itself, since it cannot commend itself except by its 'expressing', the which it does not; nor is such an Absolute commending to me, because I do not know it at all, because all attempts at knowing it are unavailing and distorting. Perhaps one can as well ask who is to see and who is to know? Advaita which denies *life* of the Absolute, or in other words, denies manifestation of the reality, imperils very life, its value and the value of the moral striving and religious realising of the individuals. All true activity, as is the manifestation of perfection or potential capacity, as seen even in the case of an artist or sculptor or poet, is an activity of self-appreciation, or if we remove the sting behind the word, is an activity of self-love. The relation between Being and manifestation is further an organic one, and intrinsic. That being the case, to deny this organic bond between manifestation and manifestor, or the relation between the universe and God, in order to accentuate the contrast of the Brahman's worthiness with that of the world or Jagat, and to deny the worthiness and reality of the universe whilst recommending the knowledge of God, is to ask us to appreciate that which has no intrinsic character of appreciableness or self-commendability. A monism achieved through such a simple method of denial-of-reality-to-the-world, is certainly not a real monism, but a mere singularism. Such a singularism which the identity implies, is absolutely uncommending and untrue. *Unity does not mean singularism or polarity of inertia,*

Truth has got value, and value is the corrective to abstractionistic Absolutistic biases. That is one criterion of truth.

Thought can know reality and can represent reality in terms of thought. That is a position that all real idealism accepts and all realism ought to accept if it should escape the solipsistic and sceptical alternatives. Knowledge is not any thing unconnected with experience but is that which is true to experience व्यवहाराशुण ज्ञानं प्रम. Ramanuja takes his stand firmly on experience as we know it and does not go beyond it, except when called for by the scriptures, which along with the orthodox schools he fully accepts. But whilst accepting them, he yet thinks that the texts must be interpreted in a way that is consonant with the experience that we are aware of, and in the way which reason could accept. And if scriptures are trust-worthy, they must, inspite of temporary exaggerations of unity and multiplicity, express a fundamental synthesis of both, and any interpretation worth its name should conduce to express the synthetic view which must be at once rational and real. Such a synthesis, Ramanuja achieves by his strict logical method.

Ramanuja could not understand how knowledge could drive out activity, or even that activity is inferior to knowledge, for in the one case, it is precisely knowledge that gives power or worth to activity, and in the other case, knowledge is organically united to activity. The intellectual impotency to grasp the essential synthesis of knowledge and activity, of gnána and karma, leads to the Sankarite dualism or rather contrarism between them, which postulates that to 'know' truth (सत्) were to sublate activity or to cease functioning. Experience reveals an (*a priori*) synthesis which is characterised by the dualisms of spirit and matter, minds (souls) and bodies, unity and multiplicity, etc., which when accentuated into clear-cut distinctions of disparate character, leads us to treat them because of their disparate character, as opposites rather than as distincts, yielding thus, as Hegel sketches, a triadic movement rather than a diadic ideal transition. But Sankara and Kant do not ask us to abandon "our conceptions of the natural world, nor even, in our daily life, cease to believe in

it ; we are to be idealists only north-northwest or transcendentally ; when the wind is southerly we are to remain realists. ..." as Santayana remarks.

IV

The Principle of Negation in Sri Ramanuja's Philosophy.

To Ramanuja more than to Sankara, one must believe from their works, the full meaning and implications of the Principle of Negation was very clear. In the consideration of the principle of negation, which is a very vital problem in knowledge as Bradley and Bosanquet in recent times have shown, we have to take note of contradiction and contrariety. "All determination is negation," and "all negation is determination". The Spinozistic axiom as well as the Hegelian corrective dictum are true. To negate certain determinations is to assert or affirm their contraries. Bare negation is meaning-less¹. The defect of Spinoza as also of Sankara lies exactly in this, that by denying all determinations to Being, they intended to make Being all-perfect. Unfortunately the Hegelian principle did not appeal to them. What Hegel was to Spinoza, Ramanuja was to Sankara. But this comparison between Hegel and Ramanuja holds only so far as this particular proposition holds, and I must think it breaks even a few steps later as we shall show, that whilst Hēgel resembles Sankara in merging activity and thought in a final synthesis by treating them as opposites, Ramanuja resembles Signor Croce by adopting them to be distincts and reals. But to proceed, Spinoza did not see that determination of character does not always mean to limit the perfection of the thing so determined. Instead, to define being is to establish its truth, is to make it be what it is, and that certainly is not to make it imperfect.

1. . . . If . being of a nature of opposite to non-intelligence and so on be not admitted as attributes of consciousness (anubhuti)—whether of a positive or negative kind—in addition to its essential nature it is altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the like, " . Sri Bhāshya, I.-i. 1. pp. 55.

Our thought, says Croce,¹ in investigating reality finds itself face to face not only with distinct but opposite concepts. The latter cannot be identified with the former. The logical category of distinctions is one thing, and the category of oppositions is another. Where one enters the other disappears. The opposite concept is slain by its opposite, eg. fancy and intellect, true and false, activity and passivity, life and death, being and non-being, etc. It is impossible to confuse the two series, so conspicuously do they differ." "The opposites are abstractions, the distincts are reals." The unity of distincts is as much a reality as the unity of opposites. The distinct that in order supersedes that below it, is implied in the existence of that under which it is subsumed, indeed, the higher organically implicates the latter's existence within its own being. The utterance of truth implicates the intuition which gave birth to it. Truth does not slay its existence or ballast it; it raises, lifts it to the logical status. Likewise when we speak of spirit we have inevitably implicated matter which is possessed by it. Matter or presentation is passive, but surcharged with spirit, it is truth and activity at the same time.

It follows that in every negation, two ideas may be involved, (1) either the abstraction of the same, or (2) the affirmation of every thing *except* this or *other* than this. Thus when we speak of non-truth, it may mean, firstly, falsity (an abstraction), or secondly, practical activity, or even feeling or intuition. Thus we see that to deny truth essentially does not mean to affirm falsity alone. It may mean assertion of its being of quite a different order of existence, as beauty, or intuition, or goodness, or usefulness. Croce, in criticising Hegel for confusing the two unconfusable series, says that in all definition of truth, intuition or representation is organically implicated, and this implication is not of the kind of implication of an abstraction

1. *What is living and what is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel.* (pp 8-32) and *Logic. part-II.*

which is an 'overcoming' and slaying of falsity, but an implication of a *real* thing within itself. No knowledge can arise without an objective presentation or intuition. Only after such an experience had taken place, can its truth be as much as questioned, and the minute the truth-value of the same be questioned, the aesthetic intuition is lifted to the logical status of a truth. Here the intuition is a real existence as much as the truth which implicates it and organises it. And all activity of the practical, viz. of utility and morality, is poised on this knowledge or truth, distorted in the former case, and true, in the latter case. It would follow that there is an ideal history of implicative process of real experiences and things under higher ones, a circular movement as it were from aesthetic intuition to logical truth, and from truth to activity, and back again to the aesthetic which is thus grasped and used.

To Sankara, the world is a hallucination, a world-dream, it is unreal, (let us not make much of its 'phenomenal reality') and will be slain when truth is known and reached; indeed having no worthiness the world has nothing of value; and though it is sometimes held that the world without Brahman is alone treated to be unreal, yet the main stress is always about its *unreal* nature. There would be no quarrel if it were held and that consistently, that without Brahman the world cannot be, for that exactly is what Ramanuja seeks to make clear by his analysis of experience and by his peculiar conception of the relation and metaphysical unity of Brahman and the world as soul and body (*śarīra-śarīra bhāva*). But *Māya* of Sankara is founded on ignorance, as such is *overcome* by true knowledge, in which case, the world would pass away as some far-off dream, dreamt in moments of ignorance (*avidya*) and when under the influence of *avidya* (*prakṛiti*). Matter, *Māya*, *avidya*, which all signify the same thing, would all vanish at the rising of knowledge, and would be completely annihilated so far as that person is concerned who has achieved the highest knowledge or Unity. The former are all eternal unfealties, abstractions, though real phenomenal entities, functioning from eternity (*मित्याभूतं सनातनः*) and slain by truth, yet

persisting because mysteriously involved, and existing in the shadow of reality. They certainly are not related to truth in any way, not only because they cannot continue except as false impotent existences, but also because, for Sankara, relations can obtain only between real entities and there is only one such real entity; and further, relations themselves are inexplicable and lead to infinite regress, the other entities must therefore be unreal yet existing entities.

To Ramanuja, however, the world is real, but its reality is subsumed and organically *implicated* in the existence of God or Absolute Spirit, just as the body is organically implicated in the existence of mind or spirit, and is dependent upon it, and without that dependence nothing could be. They are mutually dependent, but the higher distinct is truth and is *one* only and is Spirit, as such the dependence is of the lower on the higher. The relation being between real entities and a unitary conception being made possible, Ramanuja sees no reason why any trouble should arise, and why reality should be denied to any real entity. '*What is, is real, because it persists.*'¹ This mutually dependent relation between truth and intuition, spirit and matter, knowledge and activity, is fully stressed by Ramanuja. To make it still more clear that Ramanuja does not confuse the 'two unconfusable series' as Sankara seems to have done, and that the full implications of the principle of negation were completely appreciated by him, it is necessary to point to certain passages in the Sri Bhashya.

Avidya is interpreted to mean ignorance by Advaitins in the already quoted famous Isha text. But the text would be meaningless if it were interpreted in that wise. By ignorance one cannot cross over death. Ramanuja on the other hand, claims that such an interpretation would be not only meaningless and absurd, it would contradict every other text. "Whether we view non-knowledge (avidya) as a positive entity, or as the antecedent non-knowledge (abhāva) of knowledge, in either

1. Sri Bhāshya. I. i. 1.

case, it comes out as what the word indicates, viz. non-knowledge (avidya). Non-knowledge means either *absence* of knowledge, or that which is *other* than knowledge, or that which is *contradictory* to knowledge; and in any of these cases, we have to admit that non-knowledge presupposes cognition of the nature of knowledge. Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require the knowledge of the nature of light; yet when darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes cognition of light.”¹ Ramanuja after sketching the above meanings and implications of the word Avidya, proceeds to explain that, that in the Isha text the word ‘avidya’ means only works (niyamita karma) अविविद्या कर्मण. “The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of overcoming death, can only mean that which is ‘other’ than knowledge, विद्येतरं viz. prescribed works.”² Thus Ramanuja treats works as ‘other’ than knowledge. Further, he goes on to say that “knowledge does not destroy a *real* thing”,³ because it is *absence* of knowledge or the wrong knowledge that is destroyed by knowledge. And criticising Advaita which holds that agnāna is a *positive* entity, he adds that “agnāna which is a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge; just because it is a *positive* entity like jars and similar things”.⁴ Further he goes on to suggest, that knowledge is incapable of destroying the emotions and affections. “Fear and other affections are not destroyed by knowledge; they rather pass away by themselves being of a temporary nature only, and on the cessation of their cause they do not arise again.”⁵ Thus he holds that agnāna as *contradictory* to Knowledge (ज्ञानव्यतिरेक) cannot be a *positive* entity, and it is a positive entity only when interpreted to mean *other* than knowledge (ज्ञानेतर) or works.

So far the direct references in the Sri Bhāshya itself. We can now safely refer to the other work of his, equally important

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1. Sri Bhāshya 1. i. I. (pp 110. Trans.)
 2. *ibid* (p 18.) cf. *Vedārtha Samgraha* of Sri Rāmānuja.
 3. *ibid* (116p)
 4. *ibid* (114p)
 5. Sri Bhāshya 1. i. I. (116p).

as the Sri Bháshya, for a further substantiation of the view we have expounded as being the real view of Ramanuja. In commenting on the 17th and 18th verses of the *IVth Chapter of the Bhagavad Gita*, Ramanuja means by the three terms, *Karma*, *Vikarma* and *Akarma*, action, manifold duties of life (vividha karma) and Gnána, अकर्मशब्देन कर्मतरत्वात् प्रस्तुतात्मज्ञानमुच्यते (*Gita-Bhashya*). In the former instance of the Isha text avidya is interpreted to mean vidyètarat ; now in the Gita passage akarma is interpreted to mean karmètarat (other than karma). One should take that whenever the term is used as contradicting or negating a particular concept, it does not essentially follow that the negation means the opposite. In every case the immediate needs of the passage (prastuta) must be consulted. It is, however, the special way of interpretation which no other commentator,¹ either ancient or modern has followed. Bal Gangadhar Tilak in his *Gita Rahasya* means by akarma, naishkâma karma or karma that has lost its egioistic craving force.² Sri Aravinda Ghosh³ translates in his Isha upanishad, Avidya as Ignorance, which is a consciousness of multiplicity merely, without the consciousness of unity underlying the multiplicity. I personally think the interpretation of Ramanuja brings with vivid force the nature of negation, and also that wherever a negation is used between two *real* entities, there is no other way of interpreting a text except in the way of recognising it to be a distinct. In which case, the principle of distincts would-lead to a subsuming process by the higher of the lower yielding a synthesis of distincts.

Ramanuja is a Gnànakarmasamucchayavàdin, it may be claimed, and there is no reason for us to deny such a characterisation of his philosophy of life and conduct. But unlike Bhàskara, who is pre-eminently the Gnànakarmasamucchayavàdin, he holds to a personal theism, and as his commentary clearly shows, he holds that in the unity of these two, Gnàna and Karma they somehow transform themselves into Bhakti or Love, and that is the highest achievement of Unity with the Brahman and is the Goal of the Jiva.

1. It is true that Sri Sankara means in the Isha passage by Avidya, Karma, but he does not explain so clearly, and further *his* Karma is due to Ignorance.

2. *Gita Rahasya* (telugu edition. pp 929-930,)

3. *Isha upanishad* 1st edi. pp 33.

We have shown thus far that this system has almost analytically solved the problem of Philosophy by its clear and lucid explanations of the moot points in logic and epistemology, idealism and realism, and the problem and meaning of negation, and perfection and reality and their infinite grades, and the inseparable synthesis of life and knowledge. In a word, the problem of the one and the many that masquerades in an immensity of colour and variety is solved by the acceptance of the synthesis in life of mind and body, matter and spirit, in the fusion of experience, not that experience is the ultimate thing or entity, but that these two, matter and spirit, mind and body, find in the activity of creation a fusion that is inseparable and at once involved in the higher fruition of experience and enjoyment for both the entities.¹ The philosophy of Ramanuja is at once realistic, empiricistic, idealistic, and pragmatistic. It is founded on the bed-rock of religious craving and logical knowing. Even if we remove the mass of scriptural evidence that Ramanuja marshals to prove the validity of the theory and the orthodox character of his system, yet there is substantial ground for recognizing the truth-value of his system to be very high. This is an appreciation as much as one could grant. If one who is impatient of the views expressed of the future of the soul after release which the last adhyāya of the sutras and most of the Vedantic writers suggest, would but turn to the former chapters of that work and focus his attention on Ramanuja's criticism of the theory of consciousness, and his distinction between attributes and qualities, and his spiritual explanation of the relation between whole and part, as also the relation between matter and spirit as soul and body, and his appreciation of the *Theory of Distincts*, these facts are enough to grant to the author a very high place in philosophy for all time. The method of the author is very vigorous, synthetic, and finely alive to the wholistic view of reality. It ballasts not existence from life or "reality," countenances no quietistic life nor denies the manifold experiences of real life and its functions that need fulfilment, and that much is enough to grant it the palm in philosophy.

1. *Rahasyatraya Sara of Sri Vedanta Desika.*

The worship of the "God of religion" is the "intellectual love" of the Being that Spinoza so rapturously spoke about, and the "intellectual sympathy" with reality. It is this kinesis of feeling, religion, and thought, that all real existence demands. To understand in thought, to feel it in the soul, to act it in body in all their intimate triple unity is the action of the highest, and that is what the finite wants to grow into and that is the goal and the ultimate destiny of the individual personality. After all, the goal of evolution is the realisation of the highest type in the lower, the ascent of the lowest to the highest, the descent of the highest in the lower, the release of the lower into the higher worlds of realisation (for God is the bridge, setu, as also the goal), he is the means as also the end of the evolution of the individual, as the Sutras suggest. The highest self may be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being realised; "the self cannot be reached by the Veda, and so on; he whom the self chooses by him the self can be reached or gained". (II. ii. 34). The goal of knowledge, of all striving after truth is a realised Individuality, it is not a mere stereoscopic presentation of the totality of the universe or world's, like the vision of Arjuna as in the eleventh chapter of *Bhagavad Gita*, though that might be incidental (as it was incidental) in the experience of the conscious individuality of ourselves. It is the constant power to act like Gods, the fulfilled individuals, to remain the free expressions of the Highest truth or reality or Spirit, call it what you like, as possessors of a power of reflection and insight which would enable us to realise our place in relation to other beings, and to grasp their meaning by the free activity of thought. In a word, the aim is to be perfect conscious channels of force, and of the activity and will of God, the Highest Brahman. To know in that sense Brahman is to become Brahman, to become at one with him, at unity with his will. This is the destiny of knowledge, this is to know, and to become Brahman, where knowledge, and achievement are unified in a vital experience. This is truth and being, logic and metaphysics, finding solace in the bosom of reality recognized as a vital experience.

APPENDIX.

On the concept of 'Species' and 'particulars' and the Concrete Universal in Ramanuja's Sri Bhashya.

The ideas of species or genus or concept, and intuition or individual or particular, have been the moot point in all philosophies in the East as well as the west. Towards the unravelling of this problem so far as the *Sri Bhashya* is concerned only slight hints are thrown out, and those scanty hints are enough to reveal to us, the real opinion of the author regarding this problem.

To trace the history of the 'concept' in the west, we have to start with Plato, to whom the concepts or ideas have a real but non-existent character, or more truly, the ideas for Plato are the archetype of the individuals and have a one-to-one correspondence, living elsewhere from the actual. They are more real because less pliable to change, that is, to put it more bluntly, less existent, and more universal because absorbing or rather subsuming a very great, if not all, intuitions within it or under it, as the 'idea' God does. Further, from this idea, the actuals take existence. Plato had treated ideas as causes of things and the highest of them as the ultimate cause of all reality and of all knowledge¹.

Aristotle had made the idea or concept the 'form', and the individual the 'matter', and rightly opposed the separate existence of 'form' somewhere else as Plato had done; the existence of 'form' is no where else than in the 'matter', and there is no 'matter' without 'form', though here he falters just like Bergson, as he maintained quite unjustly to logic, that Absolute 'form' or God could exist without 'matter', or 'spirit' without matter.

When we come to Scotus Erigena, we find that he postulates that 'God is the supreme unity and that by a process of evolution from the general to the particular, the individual things were produced by him. First come forth the highest genera, then the lower and finally individuals. God alone truly is; he is the

1. *Phaedo* 96 et seqq.

essence of all things ; they do not exist outside of him, but he is their very substance'.

Spinoza's 'fixed and eternal things'—the ideas—are universals, abstractions, but universals treated as though they were in some sense concrete things, (Spinoza's view was that Being is the highest concrete entity, for out of abstract the concrete can never arise) and are real causes. The highest universal being that from which every individual character has been deprived was of highest perfection, because least limited in universality. To be limited means, to be limited in universality to the exclusion of some qualities (even negative) which a true universal must subsume. This line of argumentation culminates in giving rise to a Being that is an abstraction.

The Concrete Universal and abstract Universals.

The identification of a concrete universal with an abstract universal no one should tolerate. I agree with Prof. Fullerton when he says that 'the attempt to make universals (abstract) causes, yet, keep them universals (abstract) has been the source of much vague and loose reasoning²'. I also agree with him when he says that "it is simply the attempt to make them concrete and abstract at the same time." Causes are always concrete, and can never be abstract, and the so-called universals or ideas or thought or generic characters are not concrete at all, being so, how could they act as 'causes' of individual concrete existences? To make generic quality or even thought or concept, the cause of the actual individual is simply meaningless. When a 'form' is said to be the *cause* of 'matter', thought said to be the *cause* of intuition, we are left with a doubt whether these reasoners could not derive the impossibles from the absolutely non-existent or sunya. To produce a concrete existence, a concrete alone could be capable; to even will a concrete existence, only a concrete existence would be capable. The 'ideas' as Aristotle clearly understood, are not anything but the 'form' coincident and inseparable from 'matter'; they are the specific 'forms' of the

1. Ueberweg's *Hist of Philosophy* vol. 1. sec. 90.

2. *Spinoza* ; Prof. Fullerton's trans, (brackets my own),

individuals, and there could be no *causal* relation between 'form' and 'matter', species and individual, for the attempt is to make 'form' or species something *concrete* which they essentially are not, the which they must be, if they ought to be causes at all. It is meaningless to speak of '*causing*' as if there is an actual 'evolution', as Scotus Erigena definitely suggests, between 'form' and matter, or even between spirit and matter, except in the sense indicated by the first chapter, viz. the conditioning relation or inseparable (aprathiksiddha) relation of dependence between the higher and the lower distincts in the relation, for they belong to two distinct orders of existence. Concepts belong to the sphere of 'thought', the particulars to the sphere of 'fact', in spite of the fact that thought or concept finds its ground nowhere else than in the 'fact', the species in the individual, and no true logic should attempt to keep them resident elsewhere than in the fact or *sensum*. Benedetto Croce realised this fact so clearly that the concept is, he maintained¹, resident in the fact, *as such only* is it *concrete*; it is universal, because being in each and every 'representation' it is not exhausted by any one of them.

But such a concreteness and universality is due to either the inseparable *residence* or immanence in the 'fact', and such a residence or immanence is merely a organic bond, or rather, it is the *nature* of the fact itself, as Croce would maintain and as Aristotle suggested, and that is merely nothing. Laws or the body of truths, called mathematical laws, and now, perhaps, we may add the physical laws of the world, despite the relativity theory of today, are "recalcitrant to such a mode of treatment as connected with concrete reality" and cannot be "confined to brute fact", for they "are completely and unconditionally true, independently of their place in this or that particular mind", though "truth is not truth if it be not real" and though "they are brought into some sort of relation to and bearing upon reality."² In a sense and in a very concrete sense, being independent of particular minds and things, they are truly

1. *Logic* part I Sec. III.

2. *Philosophical Problems*. Lindsay.

abstract, and only concrete in this sense of always in function as 'form' of all things. To give concreteness in a sense, is to take away the implicate of universality in some sense or other, and to give them the universality is to tinge them with the air of an abstraction of thought. All the same, it is concrete, that we can admit. Let alone the concepts of Pure Mathematics, even the very Crocean concepts of time, space, quality, development, final cause etc., are eternally necessary for anything to be or to exist. They, like the Kantian categories, are very necessary for the world of experience to be. In a word, these are 'formal' categories that have to be eternally and cannot exist elsewhere than in the things for them to be. Neither could they themselves be considered apart from the world which they form, (I dare not put in the word 'manifest' as that would mean more than what one could grant), for ballasted from existence they could not be, not to speak of being true concepts.

Thus the Crocean 'concept' does not escape the 'formal' character, though to do justice to his concept, their formal character is not limited to cow, horse, etc., and such like generic 'ideas', but is truly universal and immanent in the real and in *A Priori* Synthesis with the intuition. In the *formal* constituent of reality, it resembles the generic character, which character is a *surface* character of *similarity*. The 'concept' is a *fundamental universal formal character*; the generic character is a *similarity* of 'Form' between a *large* number of particulars. In either case, they being merely the *form* of the individual, are not concrete. In fact, the concreteness of the concept is a borrowed character, because of residence in the fact and not in itself though Croce would stoutly oppose such a characterisation of his concept. This is what Ramanuja says, when he defines, or rather accepts the definition, that "species is the form of the Individual," and does not "manifest" the individual as the absolutists and platonists suggest. व्यक्तेस्तु जातिराकार इति तदभ्युपगम्य प्रतीतिः नाहं व्यक्तिं व्यन्यत्वात् प्रतीतिः. Therefore in the last resort, the universality of the concept is not and cannot claim the concreteness that is claimed by its votaries; it is an abstract character, and the

attempt to make it the 'cause' of the individual is justly condemned by Prof. Fullerton.

Spirit or intelligence is no abstract entity ; it is concrete to its core and inmost essence. Its universality is a universality that goes along with its concrete character. It is no borrowed character. *And how ?

Existence has different meanings according as to whether we predicate it of the body or mind or spirit. " When we say that a body exists, we mean that it adversely occupies space, during some intervals of time, when we say that a ' mind ' exists we mean that it is an activity enduring through continual change. There are no spatial outlines which limit minds and prevent their interpenetration."¹

Thus spirit has the pervasive character or the interpenetrative capacity, which is the same as the capacity to utilise, to subsidise every material entity, it knowing no spatial outlines and temporal barriers. The spirit, or "mind" (to adopt the western terminology) is the active principle, be it ever so much as an active pacific principle (as it is in the case of withdrawal from activity), which endures through all the changing directions or contents, never essentially undergoing transformation of character or annihilation of itself due to absorption in matter. Change in substantial character it never has, as is the case with matter, for its nature is to inflict its purposes through all the changing flux of experience or matter as it evolves in time. Thus it has been said by Ramanuja that "the origination and so on are the characteristics of the material objects and do not belong to the subjects" or souls (which are the spiritual entities which have the pervasive capacity) and "the latter are eternal". भाग्यगतमुत्पत्त्यदिकम् भोक्तारि प्रतिबिम्ब तस्य नित्यत्वम्. Spirit or intelligence is thus characterised by activity in its own nature, and in its direction, it is intelligent. This character of the spirit determines its pervasive 'presence' or existence in each and every substance or entity. Its concrete character is that of an *entity* rather than of a *concept* ; its residence in 'matter' is not like its

1. Prof. W. Carr : *The Theory of Monads*.

'form', which 'form' is an *idea*, a *volition of the intelligence itself* and these 'forms' or species may be as many as there are things, and we have said also that there are a few 'forms' to which everything in existence must conform and they form the body of 'true concepts' or 'categories', universal in range as distinguished from the species or generic 'ideas'. The *concreteness* of spirit is not mainly in its *residence* but in its *power to use*, to change, to construct and to *manifest* itself in matter, or existence, or intuition. The concreteness of the species or concept is only its 'presence' as against 'manifesting' of the spirit. Mere 'form' is certainly not capable of 'manifesting' the individual; on the other hand, spirit is capable of '*manifesting*' the '*form*' in matter. Whilst it may truly be said that the individual soul is incapable of "manifesting" 'forms' in matter, in its released state it may do that with the help of the will of God. The supreme spirit is that which 'manifests' the 'forms' and through them his own purposes; it is that which is called the creative activity of evolution. And his pervasive capacity as Antaryāmin of everything that exists determines the concreteness to an extent that is not merely 'formal' but supremely organic. God or spirit pervades the individuals, persons and things, in the same way as the metaphor goes as 'oil pervades the seed'. From Brahma to a blade of grass *आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तम्* everything has its self in that. His transcendence again is not limited to the *non-exhaustibility of the 'formal' character* by any of the 'representations', but more fully in the sense of *non-exhaustibility of activity and power*. And more truly, therefore, than what Croce means of his Concept, "every blade of grass represents God, but any number of images however great it be, does not suffice to represent him", the spirit or God suffuses all things with fulness of power and sustaining capacity which even in their aggregate, they can never possess. The transcendence implied by the statement of unequal *power*, perfection, and fulness of auspicious qualities, as applied to the Highest Spirit or God, in the sense of his being the Sole Self, who controls, sustains, and uses every existence for his own purposes absolutely and without reserve, is a transcendence quite

different and alien to the *transcendence* of the concept over the individuals. If this fact is once recognized, there can be no "vague and loose reasoning" of which Prof. Fullerton rightly charges Spinoza for trying to make spirit or God the grand Idea, or else the inexplicable synthesis of Matter and Thought, the Universal, the Cause. But such a *concrete* universal is God *only* and absolutely and there can be no other 'pervasive' principle. In a word, the absolutely concrete universal, at once *cause* of the 'universals' (formal characters) and the universe is *one* only (Ekobahunām), and He is the highest concrete entity of which the world (jagat) with souls and Prakriti are modes, they being of less pervasive universal power as Ramanuja through out his Sri Bhashya maintains. Universals there are many, but the Real Concrete Universal is only *one*.

As the Sri Bhashya definitely states its position, "If Brahmatva constitutes the logical genus, Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the *Īvara*, sentient souls and non-sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses (*aśvatva*) inheres in concrete individual horses and this contradicts all scriptural teaching (according to which Brahman is the highest concrete entity)" (Sri Bhashya III. ii. 28.), and that is nothing other than Absolute *Spirit*. एवं सर्वज्ञत्वगोत्ववद्व्यापीभूतो विश्विद्वन्मुनोभानुवर्तमानं समानयमिति सकलश्रुतिस्मृतिव्यवहारविरोधः.

We have pointed out that the real concrete universal is Spirit, and that is the Absolute. The individual jivas or spiritual finites in that case would be, that they (Brahman and Jivas) are both absolute and concrete, in this peculiar sense that these souls or selves cannot have the same extensive pervasive capacity, Sakti, as the highest or God, nor the same universality of the Absolute, though the Sūtras admit the universal knowledge to be capable of attainment by the jiva, though they warn that the jiva cannot have the ultimate power of *using* the world as it likes towards its own ends. Further its abstraction, as also perhaps we may add the abstraction of the prakriti, consists in their being incapable of coming into contact with each other, and therefore their

remaining ineffective against their own existence, (that is what it means, for to be is to persist or act), as contact between the two entities alone makes them, the souls' on the one hand, become cognizing centres or kshetragnas, and the prakriti on the other hand the evolving śakti of Brahman under the immediate direction of Brahman, till the Absolute wills their out-going or, emergence from the passivity of the Cosmic Night. But it must be clear that this abstract existentiality of these two modes of God (that is what Ramanuja calls the two existences) is not the same as the *abstractness* of the 'formal' elements or concepts, nor their 'concreteness' either. The concreteness is there in the selves in essence or by *svabhāva* ; but that concreteness is not universal as we have pointed out ; this concreteness is *individual* ; but be it noted neither is this concreteness of the same kind as that of the *sensum* or Nature or Prakriti which we recognize as the Existence, which lives under the light of the *pervasive principle* of the Highest, its own existence being an "adverse occupation of Space". That these selves even though having the same kind of concreteness as that of the Brahman do appear to be in the Pralaya condition even as the stones, as the Atomistic logicians of India, the Vaiśeṣikas, say, is the denotation of their incapacity to exist in their own right as pervasive principles unless endowed with the stronger flow of *elan vital* of the highest. They are impotent enough to be inactive but potent enough to subsist as impotent, but all the same never merged in existence, though to be correct, their existentiality as existence would be meaningless. Understood thus, we could understand that existence is a predicate as Signor Benedetto Croce affirms in his *Logic*.

When we consider that existence as we understand it, that is as existing in temporal and spatial systems, for that is what we should call existing, we have to grant the formal elements and the generic characters the ballasted existence of abstractions. Existence would mean to them a different order of existentiality from that of the things or *sensum*. We would be forced to distinguish between existentiality and existence as applied to things, and ideas and formal elements that make up the *form* of the universe.

The ideas exist as the volitional thought of the highest at all periods of time (anádikála.) Unless these infinite multitudinous generic characters, the amazing variety of forms, are present in the thought of the highest, how could they be capable of being manifest in the world of existence or pass from existentiality to existence ? The infinite totality of generic characters, or Ideas to use the Platonic expression, the eternal truths of the constitution of the universe true of every system of the universe, the destiners of the different orders of existence, are all at the beginning in the thought of the highest. So much so, the Vedas which are said to be the eternal truths were first in the thought of the Brahman, and when the world was called into existence, the Vedas were, as it were, put into operation, and the world was constructed in the same serial order and not in any other order. These Ideas or Sabda are eternally in the thought of God or Spirit. "In the beginning was the word and the word was God."

The way of the realisation of the ideas in the thing or matter may imply a descent of them into the world which only means coming into contact with matter as Plato postulates, or it may be that it is evolutionary, or it may be that every grade of existence evolved in ever so many grades so as to seem that the previous grade of existence begot the next in the series or that the Brahman by a single act of volition set all these to evolve in the spatio-temporal system in a series. Sabda thus are the eternal truths or ideas, which includes every generic character "rupa", every 'concept' (tattva), and finally every ideal (purushārtha), and all these eternally exist as sabda and only in the periods of Pravritti realise their existence in the world of experience. Their existence is true, but belong to quite a different order and kind.¹

1, There is a parallelism between our knowledge of universals and our knowledge of other minds or selves. But a distinction is necessary because their order of existence is quite different from that the concrete existences of the selves. "We cannot contemplate a universal (abstract) in and for itself apart from its relation to particulars and we cannot contemplate a mind apart from a body of some sort." But the reason why we cannot do so is different in the two cases. "A universal cannot be perceived apart from particulars, because its very nature as a universal implies a relation to particulars, while there is nothing in the nature of mind, so far as we can see, which renders its connexion with a body logically necessary; the connexion is simply an empirical fact." N. A. Duddington. *Knowledge of other minds*. Aris. Soc. Pro. vol. 19. (p. 165).

We have pointed out that the real concrete and universal existence is only spirit, and cannot pertain to any other thing or existence. The nature of the individual finite existences or things on the one hand, and the individual finite intelligences on the other, would be that they are both abstract and concrete at the same time, in this peculiar sense, that these souls or jivas, cannot have the pervasive capacity with the same universality or intensity of the Absolute, but are really so capable of becoming relatively in so far as 'knowing' is concerned, and not in so far as using the whole world is concerned. The things have an abstract character in so far as they exist apart from and cannot have the pervasive (vyāpakatva) capacity is considered. They are, as much an *a priori Synthesis* as the form and existence which we may agree in calling along with Croce as the History of Spirit. In some such sense perhaps Sri Ramanuja accepts the intimate relation between the Concrete Universal and Sabda—an inference based upon his consistent acceptance of the three Continuums, namely, cause-effect, Substance-attribute, and the psycho-physical or mind-body.

E R R A T A

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
2	34	or	nor*
3	36	that	those
9	12	<i>causaefficiens</i>	<i>causa efficiens</i>
13	12-13	Ēkatva-ār	Ēkatva or
21	26	It is imperfect surely, but unreal it is not.	They are imperfect surely, but unreal they are not.
30	37	alone	alone is
31	35	What	what
33	35	preceeded	preceded
42	32	bea	being
45	16	acheived	achieved
46	30	„	„
53	17	source	source of
54	30	unconciuous	unconscious
62	6	continum	continuum
63	34	priar	prior
66	36	tself	itself
68	3	though	through
86	6	causl	causal
92	5	them ethod	the method
103	13	mutally	mutually

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| 9. Sruta Prakāsika | ... | Commentary on the Sri Bhāshya. |
| 10. Rahasyatraya Sāra | ... | Sri Vedānta Desika. |
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| 12. Artha Panchaka | | |

A reference may be made to "Jiva as a Prakāra of Isvara" by Prof. P. N. Srinivāsāchārya M. A. an illuminating paper read at the Oriental Conference held at Madras in 1925, which unfortunately I had not come across till this work was sent to the press.

